Long-term effects of the Paraguayan War (1864 - 1870): from male scarcity to intimate partner violence by Boggiano, Barbara
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  B A R B A R A  B O G G I A N O
/ /  N O . 2 0 - 0 2 4  |  0 5 / 2 0 2 0
Long-Term Effects of the  
Paraguayan War (1864 – 1870): 
From Male Scarcity to Intimate 
Partner Violence
Long-term effects of the Paraguayan War (1864-1870):
from male scarcity to intimate partner violence.
Barbara Boggiano∗
May 2020
Abstract
This paper investigates the long-term effects of the Paraguayan War (1864–1870) on in-
timate partner violence. The identification of these causal effects relies on a novel historical
dataset from which I exploit the distance from municipalities to military camps during the
war. Over 130 years later, the likelihood of intimate partner violence is still 5.54 percent
higher than average in municipalities that were more heavily affected by the war. The loss
of life among men led to female-biased sex ratios and defined Paraguay as the ’country of
women’. However, I show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, female-biased sex ratios
are not the only driver of the long-term effects of the war. Instead, the main transmission
channel is the relative status of females within the household. Male scarcity leads to atypical
status inconsistencies within the household that do not respect traditional gender roles and
induces intimate partner violence that is transmitted across generations.
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“War is a great social catalyst from which neither victor nor vanquished can escape. In conflicts that
result in catastrophic loss of life, the very foundations of society are seriously weakened. But, so long
as a viable remnant of the old order remains, historical continuities are not completely destroyed and
the opportunity exists for starting anew. These generalizations are especially applicable to Paraguay”.
Warren, H., & Warren, K., “Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: the postwar decade, 1869-1878”.
1 Introduction
The socio-economic role of women has undergone rapid change in recent decades. Nonethe-
less, violence against women is a violation of human rights which remains a global issue tran-
scending national boundaries as well as socio-economic, cultural and racial distinctions. Accord-
ing to the United Nations, the global economic cost of violence against women amounts to two
percent of GDP worldwide (UN Women, 2016).
Paraguayan women have encountered more challenges in trying to achieve social equality
than their counterparts in the region and around the world. Intimate partner violence is one
of the many challenges they face, with 38.1 percent reporting to have been victims of intimate
partner violence during their lifetime compared to 30 percent worldwide (Castillo, 2011; Garc´ıa-
Moreno et al., 2013).1
In this paper, I use novel historical data to study the long-term effect of war on intimate
partner violence (IPV). I link current variations in IPV against women within Paraguay to
a sizeable demographic shock that accompanied one of the most critical events in Paraguayan
history: the Paraguayan War (1864–1870). This war was the bloodiest conflict in Latin American
history. It led to one of the greatest female-biased sex ratios ever recorded since it had a
disproportional impact on the male population between 15 and 50 years of age, see Table 1. In
the municipality most affected by the war, historical evidence suggests the presence of 5 males
per 100 females of fertile age (Whigham and Potthast, 1999).
I find that today, more than 130 years later, in municipalities that were more heavily affected
by the war, IPV is 1.89 percentage points more likely than in the average municipality. This
implies that the likelihood of IPV is 5.54 percent higher than average in municipalities that were
more heavily affected by the war. I then present evidence related to male survival rates as well
as historical gender differences in human capital and labour participation suggesting that the
main transmission channel is the relative status of females within the household.
To quantify the causal effect of the war on levels of IPV today, I employ a novel identification
strategy. I define Weighted Inverse Distance (WID) as the average inverse distance from a
1Paraguayan females additionally face barriers in the labour market, fertility and reproductive control, low literacy
rates and lack of property rights (N˜opo, 2012; Be´rtola and Williamson, 2017; Petrozziello et al., 2011).
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neighbourhood to the five military camps during the war, weighted by camp size, as military
camps were more likely to recruit soldiers from the municipalities located closer to them. This
measure is similar to others used in the literature, such as Valencia Caicedo (2018), but also
accounts for the size of the military camps since bigger camps were likely to draft more men.2
Any long-term effect of the war on IPV cannot be directly explained by long-lasting changes
in demographic variables as these revert to normal within a generation or two. Instead, the
gender norms that emerged in the aftermath of the war can cause long-lasting effects as they
are transmitted across generations (see Ferna´ndez et al., 2004 in the context of female labour
participation and Pollak, 2004 in the context of IPV). Among the many transmission channels
that could be at play, I analyse two opposing channels which reflect some of these emerging
norms. Firstly, I examine evidence compatible with male scarcity enabling females’ financial
independence, which is associated with a reduction in IPV. Secondly, I examine evidence con-
sistent with male scarcity leading to atypical status inconsistencies within the household where
men are disadvantaged with respect to their partners and are, consequently, more likely to
engage in IPV (Molm, 1997; Macmillan and Gartner, 1999). I refer to these channels as the
financial independence channel and the relative status channel, respectively. I present evidence
that corroborates the relevance of both transmission channels. However, the positive long-term
effect of the war on IPV suggests that the relative status channel dominates.
There is ample theoretical and empirical literature suggesting that female labour partici-
pation increases when men are scarce, or more specifically in the presence of female-biased sex
ratios (Becker, 1973; Goldin, 1991; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Goldin and Olivetti, 2013; Teso, 2018).
However, there were institutional barriers such as females being deemed unfit to perform any
critical socio-economic role without a male’s permission (Capdevila, 2010). I consider absolute
male scarcity by looking at male survival rates. I measure how many males survived the war
as a proportion of the projected male population if no war had taken place. If these figures
are low—the absolute loss of male lives is severe—female labour participation would increase.
This is despite females being considered unfit to perform almost any critical role, as critical
roles cannot wait to be filled by a future generation of males. Females therefore would perform
traditionally male tasks despite the institutional barriers. This could lead to higher levels of
female financial independence, which is associated with lower levels of IPV as income allows
females to leave abusive relationships (Aizer, 2010). Contraty to this, females performing tradi-
tionally male tasks could also lead an improvement their relative status within the household, a
known risk factor of IPV (Macmillan and Gartner, 1999). This happens as, in contexts of male
2Enforcement of the compulsory draft is likely to have been weaker the further away a male lived from a military
camp. This is because men were drafted on foot (Thompson, 1869). A fundamental premise of this paper’s
analysis is the exogeneity of camps’ placement and size. I address this in detail in Section 5.
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scarcity, females are more likely to be more educated, to participate in the labour market, and
to contribute more, which shapes different gender identities and relations within the household
and, ultimately, inducing IPV.
I corroborate the importance of the relative status channel by showing that male survival
rates were lower in areas more severely affected by the war and that IPV is higher in places
with lower male survival rates. Males were also less likely to be educated relative to females
and gender differences in labour participation were lower in areas more heavily affected by the
war, despite the institutional barriers. Moreover, I show that today, IPV is more prevalent in
municipalities where males were less likely to be educated than females and where the historical
gender differences in labour participation were lower. These results suggest that females were
more likely to have a better relative status within the household in areas more severely affected
by the war, a factor which is positively related to current levels of IPV. This channel outweighs
the alternative financial independence channel for which I show that female-biased sex ratios
are more pronounced in areas more heavily affected by the war, which is negatively related to
current levels of IPV.
The findings presented in this paper contribute to three strands of literature. Firstly, they
contribute to a nascent literature on the historical roots of attitudes towards gender roles by
showing that a war can shape gender norms in a way that has long-term effects on IPV. I
provide evidence that, in the Paraguayan context, a more severe demographic shock increases
the likelihood of IPV in the long run, suggesting that the labour market results observed in
the literature lead to higher instead of lower levels of IPV. This is a consequence of the threat
to males posed by women having a better relative status within the household, which makes
an important contribution to their ability to leave an abusive relationship due to higher levels
of financial independence. Secondly, these findings have policy implications that go beyond
those presented in the existing economic literature on IPV since they provide evidence of the
long-term causes. In terms of public policy, examining historical demographic shocks and the
resulting changes in gender norms enables us to better target policies against IPV. Lastly, this
paper contributes to the historical literature by constructing a unique data set that documents
the consequences of the war on Paraguayan demographics, school attendance and female labour
participation in the aftermath of the war and in the long term.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the literature. The
historical background is discussed in Section 3 and the data is described in Section 4. I analyse
the WID measure’s exogeneity and validity in Section 5. In Section 6, I describe the main
empirical specification and present its corresponding results. I explore the transmission channels
in Section 7. Robustness checks are presented in Section 8. In Section 9, I conclude.
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2 Literature Review
This paper builds on the literature on historical determinants of development (Nunn, 2009,
2014).3 In particular, it relates to previous work studying the long-term effects of demographic
shocks on the socio-economic and political role of women. There is substantial literature that
attributes these long-run effects to changes in norms regarding the role of females within the
family, in the public/political arena and the labour market. Gender norms emerge and persist
as they are transmitted across generations (Ferna´ndez et al., 2004; Pollak, 2004).4
Male scarcity incentivises females to replace males in the labour market and also reduces
female bargaining power within the household due to the low opportunity cost for males of
re-matching in the marriage market. As a consequence, more conservative attitudes towards
women within the household can materialise.5 Consistent with the effects of female-biased sex
ratios on marriage markets and intra-household bargaining power presented by Becker (1973),
women are less likely to marry (Abramitzky et al., 2011; Brainerd, 2017), more likely to have
children out of wedlock (Bethmann and Kvasnicka, 2013), and more likely to work (Goldin, 1991;
Acemoglu et al., 2004; Goldin and Olivetti, 2013) whenever males are scarce. Teso (2018) traces
the long-term effects of the transatlantic slave trade on current variations in women’s labour
force participation. He finds evidence that women whose ancestors were more exposed to this
shock are more likely to participate in the labour force today.6 The literature mentioned above
focused on females replacing males in the labour market and its consequences; in my paper,
however, I focus on an unexplored consequence of male scarcity in the form of IPV.
An understanding of historical and cultural roots is crucial to the analysis of IPV. Alesina
et al. (2016) find that when women are more economically valuable—through dowry and home
production—they are less likely to be subjected to intrafamily violence, and this type of violence
is considered less acceptable. However, they do not investigate how demographic patterns may
have impacted IPV. Natural historical experiments provide a setting in which to address this
issue. This paper links a demographic shock (the Paraguayan War) to the presence of IPV in
the long run.
The prevalence of IPV has increasingly been recognised as an important public health issue
3The critical role of human capital for development is well established (Becker et al., 1990; Benhabib and Spiegel,
1994; Barro, 2001). Valencia Caicedo (2018) finds that the distance from the nearest Jesuit mission has significant
and large negative effects on educational attainment 250 years after the expulsion of the missionaries. To acquire
a more in-depth understanding of the role of historical institutions in development, see Dell (2010).
4For other relevant papers see Alesina et al. (2013) and Guiso et al. (2016).
5Notably, more conservative attitudes also arise in the context of male-biased sex ratios (Grosjean and Khattar,
2019; Amaral and Bhalotra, 2017). However, the channels of transmission are different.
6There also is ongoing concurrent work on the long-term effects of the Paraguayan War by Alix-Garcia et al. (2020).
However, the measure of the impact of the war (distance to the warpath) is different, as are the outcomes of
interest. One of Alix-Garcia et al. (2020) main outcomes is female labour participation for which I find similar
results, see Appendix D.
5
worldwide.7 There is ample literature relating gender differences in the labour market—such
as gender differences in unemployment risk and gender wage gaps—to IPV. Aizer (2010) shows
that increasing a woman’s relative wage reduces IPV by improving her outside options. Consis-
tent with the female independence channel described earlier, she shows that reducing the gender
wage gap also reduces IPV. Similarly, Anderberg et al. (2016) develops a model according to
which a partnership provides insurance against unemployment risk through the pooling of re-
sources. This, in turn, leads to a negative relationship between risk of male unemployment and
IPV and a positive relationship between risk of female unemployment and IPV. In contrast to
this approach, research on atypical inconsistencies in status among members of the household
examines IPV when the female resources—cultural and socio-economic—are greater than those
of the male partner. In this context, the disadvantaged party—the husband—would be more
likely to resort to coercion (Molm, 1997). This atypical status inconsistencies are usually in
terms of education, occupation, or income within marital relationships. Macmillan and Gart-
ner (1999) provides evidence of how employment and education play a critical role on IPV as
the relative statuses of husbands and wives within the household where gendered expectations
of male authority and female dependence generate IPV. I provide evidence suggesting that, in
Paraguay, the coercion effect of a higher female relative status within the household—in terms
of labour participation and, ultimately, income—is more dominant than the protection effect
that financial independence provides against IPV. These negative consequences of atypical in-
consistencies in status that do not respect traditional gender norms are consistent with recent
evidence on women trying to follow traditional gender norms also in developed countries. Roth
and Slotwinski (2020) shows that in Switzerland women misreport their income in surveys to
avoid to out-earn their partner and respect gender norms.
3 Historical Background
Although civil wars and internal conflicts were relatively common in the Rio de la Plata
Basin in the nineteenth century, there were fewer wars between the individual countries in the
region and these were not comparable with the Paraguayan War in terms of length, casualties
and economic losses. The war and its consequences have been the subject of much debate in
South America, both in the historical literature and public opinion. Historians have debated
7In particular, some previous studies have analysed the relationship between emotional cues and IPV, both from
the perspective of the perpetrators’ criminal behaviour and the victim. Card and Dahl (2011) show that a
team losing a football match unexpectedly has a positive impact on IPV. From the victims’ perspective, Ishida
et al. (2010) find evidence of an association between IPV and common mental disorders in Paraguay. They find
evidence that emotional abuse, regardless of when it occurred, is associated with an increased risk for common
mental disorders, whereas recent physical abuse is associated with an increased risk for suicidal ideation.
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at length on the magnitude of the demographic shock after the war. Among historians, there
are two main positions regarding the consequences of the war. According to Reber (1988), the
war cost Paraguay between 8.7 and 18.5 percent of the pre-war population. Contrasting with
this analysis, Whigham and Potthast (1999) show novel evidence of 60 to 69 percent loss of life
during the war using the previously undiscovered 1870 Census.
The Paraguayan War began in late 1864 as a result of an opposition uprising in Uruguay
where Paraguay ended up on the opposing side to Argentina and Brazil. For more details about
the causes of the conflict, see Appendix A.
Paraguay began active preparations for war in March 1864 with a military force of 80,000
males in five military camps (Cerro Leo´n, Encarnacio´n, Humaita´, Asuncio´n and Concepcio´n).
Mortalities, injuries and desertion reduced the pool of able-bodied men. One year into the
conflict, 40,000 men had already died—both from disease and in battle outside Paraguay’s
territory—and 10,000 surrendered.8
In early 1867, the Paraguayan army had no more than 20,000 men left to fight the Allies
(Reber, 1999). By the end of the year, a second, broader call to arms was issued for males
between the ages of 12 and 60. Local authorities were required to provide an overview of the
draft-eligible male population that met the age requirement.
By December 1869, the Paraguayan army was split, and most Paraguayan forces had sur-
rendered. In the end, the remaining forces—6,000 males—were driven to the northern frontier
of Paraguay. On arrival there was only a handful of men, the rest had either perished along
the way, deserted or had been killed trying. On 1 March 1870, Solano Lopez—Paraguay’s army
leader—was wounded and died later that day. His death marked the end of the Paraguayan
War. Figure 1 summarises the 1864-1870 period.
The post-war reconstruction in Paraguay included the adoption of the Constitution and the
Civil and Marriage Codes (1870–1897). These legal acts excluded females from all forms of
power, putting them under the tutelage of their fathers or husbands in all matters pertaining
to management and/or inheritance of assets. The Marriage Code declared females as unfit to
perform almost any critical role—but agriculture and home production—representing a step
backwards for women’s rights in Paraguay.9 Moreover, women were not entitled to manage the
expenses of their household, they were not allowed to act as witnesses in public affairs, and they
were obliged to ask for permission to practice a profession (Capdevila, 2010).
8Most of them surrendered in the siege of Uruguayana (Brazil) in 1865 during the campaign to help the Blancos
in Uruguay. After the siege, 5,545 out of 8,000 soldiers surrendered and the rest died of hunger and sickness.
9The relative lack of women’s rights compared to men’s was common in the region but not the norm in Paraguay.
Before 1864, Paraguayan women were the heads of their households, meaning they held a position of power and
authority. This step backwards also reflects how long it took for Paraguayan females to gain full rights compared
to women from other countries in the region (Uruguay in 1946, Brazil in 1962, Argentina in 1968 and Paraguay
in 1992). For more details on the evolution of women’s civil rights in the region, see Giordano (2013).
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Historical accounts also describe a less favourable marriage market for females after the
war. The more vulnerable position of women in Paraguay is reflected in how marriages were
represented. Figure 3 shows how different aspects of the marriage changed negatively before,
during and after the war.
Moreover, Paraguayan women were expected to be dedicated solely to the subsistence of
the Paraguayan nation while the few remaining males were to be dedicated to rebuilding the
institutional structure devastated by the war. In 1870, Paraguay was left with no schools. By
1876, there were 350 schools, 320 of which catered for 10,000 boys and 30 of which catered for
just 2,000 girls (Warren and Warren, 1978).
4 Data
4.1 Historical Data
To study the long-term impact of the Paraguayan War on IPV, I match individual-level data
from the Paraguayan National Survey of Demography and Sexual and Reproductive Health with
historical data. Table 2 summarises the five sources of historical data used.
The first source is the Census of 1870, as documented by Whigham and Potthast (1999).
From this Census, I observe the total population stratified by gender and age groups in 34 out of
92 municipalities.10 The second source is the lists of draft-eligible males in December 1867 and
January 1868 for 45 of the 92 municipalities. The third source of information is the 1846 Census
(Williams, 1976). This census includes the total population classified by age and freedom status
groups in 69 out of the 92 municipalities. The fourth source is the 1886 Statistical Yearbook
of the Paraguayan Republic (Anuario Estadistico de las Republica del Paraguay, 1886) which
includes data on the school system and a summary of the 1886 Census by gender and age
group. The fifth and final source of historical data is Thompson (1869) from which I retrieve
the locations and sizes of the military camps in 1864.
In the aftermath of the war, a provisional government recognised the need to know the level
of resources the country still had at its disposal (Whigham and Potthast, 1999).11 The findings
in the 1870 Census were grouped by gender and age groups consisting of ancianos (elderly, over
50 years of age), jo´venes (young, a young person between 12 and 50), and nin˜os (children, a
child under the age of 12).12 From this, I was able to calculate the male/female sex ratio in
10See Figure 2 for a map of the 95 municipalities (four correspond to neighbourhoods within Asuncio´n).
11A provisional government was created as soon as the Brazilian occupation of Asuncio´n began in January 1870.
The politicians involved were in exile during the government of Solano Lopez and belonged to the Legion
Paraguaya which fought alongside the Allied Forces against Solano Lopez.
12According to Whigham and Potthast (1999), the definition of these categories seems to vary from place to place,
but for the majority, the age ranges described hold.
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each of the 34 municipalities immediately after the war, as shown in Table 4.13 This allows me
to examine the immediate effects of the war on sex ratios. However, since the 1870 Census is
only available for 34 municipalities, I also perform the analysis using data from the 1886 Census.
With the 1886 Census, I can distinguish between narrower age groups/age groups with narrower
ranges. I then classify them by their participation in the war using the following categories: (I)
newborns, (II) people who were born after the war (ages 1–14), (III) people who were born prior
to or during the war but were too young to be drafted (ages 15–30) and (IV) people who were
born before the war and were compulsorily drafted in 1868 (ages 31+). I perform the analysis
only for the group (IV) sample.
The draft-eligible males’ lists contain individual information regarding all males aged 12 and
older including full name, age, medical condition (if any), military rank (if any) and freedom
status (in the case of slaves and libertos).14 I collected 45 lists, representing 45 municipalities,
from the Asuncio´n’s National Archives (Archivo Nacional de Asuncio´n) via the digitalisation
conducted by the Utah Genealogical Society. These lists contain information about 11,081
males out of a total 121,254 projected to be alive in 1867/1868 (Boggiano, 2020). Combining
the information in the lists of draft-eligible males with the Census of 1846, I calculate the survival
rates of males. I match 42 observations from the lists of draft-eligible males to the population
projections using the latest available census. I use the male survival rates measure as a proxy
for absolute male scarcity, where a higher male survival rate implies lower male scarcity and
vice versa. Using the same data, I also calculate the rate of non-compliance with the first draft.
I can then show that the enforcement of the compulsory draft in 1864 was weaker the further
away the men lived from a military camp.
I also look into changes in human capital investments and labour participation using data
from the 1886 Statistical Yearbook. I use data on school attendance by gender for the 89
municipalities in 1886 to calculate out-of-school rates by municipality and by gender and their
differences. From the same source, I also use data on female and male teachers to analyse the
short-term effects of the war on female labour participation.
4.2 Contemporaneous Data
This paper uses data on IPV and female labour participation from a collection of surveys
conducted by the Paraguayan Center for Population Studies (CEPEP), with technical assistance
13In Figure E.1, I show the spatial distribution of the municipalities in the 1870 Census and their respective
male/female sex ratios. For the Caapucu´ municipality, I only observe the total female population without the
distinction by age group, which does not allow me to calculate the gender imbalance for the fertile population.
I then proxy this by using all males over all females instead.
14Libertos were the children of slaves born after 1943 who owed service to their mothers’ masters until the age of
25 if they were male and 24 if they were female (Cooney, 1974).
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from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in 2004 and 2008 with a total of 13,777
women between 15 and 44 years old residing in Eastern Paraguay.15
The 2004 and the 2008 Paraguayan National Survey of Demography and Sexual and Repro-
ductive Health (Encuesta Nacional de Demograf´ıa y Salud Sexual y Reproductiva) employed a
multi-stage cluster sample based on the 2002 Census tracts. A total of 352 and 384 census tracts
were randomly selected for the 2004 and 2008 surveys, respectively; a number of households,
proportional to the size of the population, were randomly selected from each cluster, and one
woman aged 15–44 years was randomly selected from each household for the interview. The
individual response rate was 97.4 percent (2004) and 95.1 percent (2008), and the final, nationally
representative sample consists of 7,321 and 6,540 women, respectively. Data were collected
using a standardised questionnaire in face-to-face household interviews conducted from August
to September 2003 and June to October 2008. An “intimate partner” is defined as a current
or former partner in either a consensual or a marital union. IPV is classified as being either
emotional, physical or sexual. The portion of the interview concerning IPV was conducted with
women who had been in either a marital or a consensual union at some point in their lives and
was only carried out when privacy was secured.16
I include four measures of IPV: (1) emotional, (2) physical, (3) sexual, and (4) any kind.
Emotional IPV takes a value of 1 when the interviewed female has responded affirmatively to
questions on whether she has been subjected to insults, public humiliations or threats. Physical
IPV takes a value of 1 when the interviewed female has responded affirmatively to questions on
whether she has been slapped, pushed, punched or kicked, threatened with an object and/or
strangled or burned by her partner. Sexual IPV takes a value of 1 when the interviewed female
has responded affirmatively to a question whether she has been forced to have sex against her
will by her partner. If any of the above has been responded to affirmatively, a dummy for any
kind of IPV takes a value of 1, and 0 otherwise.
The cartographic data which allows me to match the individual-level data with historical
data was provided by the Cartography Department of the Department of Statistics, Surveys
and Censuses (Direccio´n General de Estad´ıstica, Encuestas y Censos, DGEEC). From the 2002
Census, I am able to identify the location at the neighbourhood level of 6,668 out of 9,161
individuals who reported to have been in a marital or consensual union at some point in their
lives and responded to the 2004 or 2008 surveys, while for the rest I am able to locate them within
their corresponding municipality (see Table 4). By identifying their location, I am able to link
15The Paraguayan National Survey of Demography and Sexual and Reproductive Health is a survey with national
coverage, but I excluded the observations that were not located in Eastern Paraguay due to the focus of this
paper. For descriptives of the sample used, see Table 5.
16Before the interview, the respondents were told that their information would be handled with discretion.
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them with the WID measure and historical data to examine whether the war has long-lasting
effects on IPV.
5 Weighted Inverse Distance—Exogeneity and Validity
In this section, I describe the main explanatory variable of the analysis, weighted inverse
distance (WID). I also show that it captures the impact of the war and I validate the implicit
exogeneity assumption regarding the camps’ location and sizing.
I proxy the impact of the war via the distance to military camps. In particular, my measure
weights the inverse distance to all military camps by the size of the respective camps relative to
the overall military force drafted in 1864.
WIDjk =
5∑
c=1
1
DistToCampcjk
∗ SizeOfCampc,
where c are the five military camps, j is the contemporaneous neighbourhood where the females
are located, and k is the municipality (both historical and contemporaneous).17
I use data on the location and size of the military camps from Thompson (1869). Distance
to a camp is calculated using cartographical data provided by the DGEEC.
To examine whether the WID measure captures the impact of the war, I perform two anal-
yses. Firstly, I check whether the WID measure correlates with post-war male/female sex ratios,
male survival rates, and human capital levels and labour participation outcomes for females (both
in absolute and relative terms). This analysis allows me to examine whether the war had an
immediate effect on male scarcity and women’s financial independence and relative status within
the household. A more detailed discussion of the importance of these results can be found in
Section 7.3. Secondly, I check whether municipalities with a higher WID measure exhibit lower
levels of non-compliance with the first compulsory draft of 1864. This analysis allows me to test
the assumption that the further away from a military camp a municipality was, the stricter the
enforcement of the compulsory draft.18
17Before 1864, the army comprised of 28,000 males. In March, the military Camp at Cerro Leo´n was established
where 30,000 men between the ages of 15 and 50 were recruited. From March to August 1864, recruits were
drafted into camps at Encarnacio´n (17,000), Humaita´ (10,000), Asuncio´n (4,000) and Concepcio´n (3,000). Six
thousand men died during this period due to diarrhea, dysentery, measles and smallpox (Thompson, 1869). See
Table 4 for a list of distances of municipalities to the largest military camp (Cerro Leo´n) and Figure 2 for the
list and map of the municipalities in 1864.
18A crucial premise of this analysis is Paraguay’s lack of immigration after the war since one of the main character-
istics of late 19th and early 20th-century demographics is European immigration to South America. However,
Paraguay was the exception. In contrast to other countries in the region, before the war none of the three
dictatorships promoted immigration. Moreover, under the first post-independence government (1811–1840),
marriages with foreigners required the permission of the government and were usually denied. After the war,
the liberal governments in Paraguay copied their counterparts in the region and started promoting immigration.
However, unlike neighbouring countries such as Argentina or Brazil, Paraguay did not attract massive numbers
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In Figure 4, I show a negative relationship between WID and male/female sex ratios and
male survival rates once outliers are accounted for.19 These short-term consequences of the war
are key since conventional wisdom suggests that they have an impact on IPV that is transmitted
across generations.20 Relevant demographics return to natural levels after the end of the war
(see Figure 5). As a result, any evidence on the long-term effect of the WID measure on IPV
cannot be explained by the sex ratios or male survival but only by the gender norms regarding
women’s position within the family and society generated by those factors.21
In line with historical accounts by Warren and Warren (1978) and Capdevila (2010), one
can conjecture that a social norm emerged after the war which made it more difficult for girls
to get an education. However, in Figure 6a, I present a negative relationship between WID and
girls’ out-of-school rates—uneducated girls—and, in Figure 6b, I present a positive relationship
between gender differences in out-of-school rates (OSR) and the WID measure. This implies
that municipalities more severely affected by the war exhibit higher levels of female human
capital, i.e. fewer uneducated females, and males are less likely to be more educated relative
to females. This evidence suggests that there is more gender equality in education in the more
severely affected municipalities.
Furthermore, in Figure 6c and Figure 6d, I show that there is a positive relationship between
the WID measure and female teachers per child at school and a negative relationship between
the difference of male and female teachers per child at school and the WID measure. Teaching
was one of the few professions available to women after the war and the only profession available
to males and females simultaneously. This suggests that females are more likely to work in the
aftermath of the war in the municipalities that were more heavily affected and, therefore, also
more likely to have an income. Moreover, this also suggests that, in municipalities more affected
by the war, females replaced males in the only profession where that was possible.
In summary, the war had a considerable impact both in terms of demographics and socio-
economic outcomes for females.
To check the assumption that males were less likely to be drafted the further away they were
from a military camp, I analyse non-compliance with the first draft. Specifically, Using the WID
measure, I examine whether municipalities with a higher number of males between the age of
15 and 50 in 1864 (19 and 54 in 1868) that, according to the lists of draft-eligible males of 1868
of immigrants. Most immigrants entering Paraguay settled in rural colonies and did not mix with the local
population.
19The measure of male survival rates used is built on the assumption of unbiased sex ratios pre-war. Results also
hold when an alternative female-biased sex ratio scenario is applied.
20For more detail regarding the strength of these relationships, see Appendix E.
21An analysis of the fertility patterns after the war would help us to understand how long it take for demographics
to return to their natural rates. In Appendix G.1, I analyse the role of changes in fertility patterns after the
war.
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were not medically discharged, are further away from the military camps.
The number of males who were eligible in 1864 and appear on the lists of draft-eligible
males of 1867/1868 as not having been medically discharged is low. However, in Figure 7, I
present the negative relationship between the non-compliance rate and the WID measure (n =
38, ρ = -0.1656). This shows that a higher WID measure—lower distance to camps—negatively
correlates with non-compliance. This evidence suggests that it became harder for the Paraguayan
Government in 1864 to enforce the compulsory draft the further away and smaller a military
camp was.
To examine whether the WID measure is likely to be exogenous, I analyse whether the
camps were the optimal location and size. I use the population data from the 1846 Census. I
generate as many points per municipality as its total population. I look for the size and location
of camps, which minimises the average distance between each person and the closest camp. I
run a K-medians clustering algorithm with five clusters corresponding to the five camps 15,000
times.22 The algorithm gives me the optimal location of the camps. I calculate the size of each
camp by counting the points that belong to each cluster. I then rescale the camp sites so that
in total the number of drafted males matches historical records (64,000 males).
In Figure 8, I present the optimal locations and sizes of camps based on the 1846 Census
collected by Williams (1976).23 There is little overlap between the optimal location and size of
camps and the actual locations reported by Thompson (1869). Both camps along the southern
border of Paraguay were misplaced/missized given the population in the area. None of the camps
properly covered the population of the eastern area of the country. Similarly, there should have
been more camps given the population density in the centre of the country.
Overall, this confirms that the location and sizes of camps imposed by Solano Lopez were
not optimal and, therefore, corroborates the assumption that camps’ locations and sizes were
exogenous.
6 The Long-Term Effects of the Paraguayan War on IPV
The main contribution of this paper is to quantify the long-lasting effects of a war on IPV
and to study the role played by different channels in explaining the effect’s persistence. I link
current variations in reported IPV within Paraguay to the impact of the Paraguayan War in
different municipalities of Eastern Paraguay.
To do this, I regress different measures of IPV—emotional, physical, sexual, and any kind of
22The algorithm only ensures that local minima will be found. In terms of distances, this algorithm uses the
sum of absolute differences. Each centroid is the component-wise median of the points in that cluster. For the
standard K-means clustering algorithm with the square of Euclidean distances, see Figure B.2.
23In Figure B.1, I present the same analysis but with census data collected by Kegler de Galeano (1976).
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IPV—from the surveys on the WID measure corresponding to the neighbourhood in which the
surveyed respondent resides. The model I develop is the following:
P (IPVijk = 1 |WIDjk, Xijk) = 1 (β1WIDjk +X ′ijk∆ ≥ εijk). (1)
IPVijk is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the individual i, in neighbourhood j, in mu-
nicipality k has been subjected to IPV, WIDjk is the WID measure for neighbourhood j, in
municipality k, Xijk a set of covariates at the individual level, and εijk is the individual error
term clustered at the neighbourhood level.24 I denote each observation both by neighbourhood
i and municipality j, as I also perform part of the analysis with historical data which is at the
municipality level.
I assume that observations are independent across groups (clusters) but allow for them to be
correlated within groups, E (εijk εgjk) 6= 0. This relaxes the usual requirement that observations
should be independent at the individual level. Given this specification, I cluster the errors at
the neighbourhood level.
Table 6 presents the marginal effects over the means of Equation (1). As a baseline, I
present the direct effect of WID on different IPV outcomes—emotional, physical, sexual, and
any kind of IPV—in each column from (1) to (4) clustered at the neighbourhood-level without
any individual-level controls. The sample analysed comprises a total of 9,161 respondents in 503
clusters.25 In columns (5) to (8), I include individual-level controls. Individual-level controls
include the age of the respondent, area of residence—urban or rural—, and whether the respon-
dent speaks Spanish. All coefficients on IPV are positive, statistically significant and largely
unaffected by the inclusion of individual-level controls. I also report the mean and standard
deviation of the outcomes analysed.
An increase of one standard deviation in the mean WID measure, which is equal to 0.027,
increases the likelihood of a female being subjected to any kind of IPV by 3.06 percentage points.
In column (8), I include individual-level controls which reduce this likelihood to 1.89 percentage
points or 5.54 percent of the sample mean. Similar coefficients can be found for the more specific
types of violence. In the case of emotional violence, an increase of one standard deviation in the
mean WID measure increases the likelihood of a female being subjected to emotional IPV by
1.66 percentage points or 4.87 percent of the sample mean. Similarly, for physical violence, the
increase is 0.96 percentage points (5.64 percent of the sample mean), while for sexual violence,
the corresponding figure is 0.68 percentage points (11.03 percent of the sample mean). All these
24Even for the observations I cannot geographically locate at the neighbourhood level within a municipality, a
neighbourhood identifier is still available. I cluster the observations by using this neighbourhood identifier, and
I use the average of the WID measures for all neighbourhoods in the relevant municipality.
25In the case of sexual IPV responses, the final sample is 9,160 in 503 clusters.
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results include individual-level controls. Since a more detailed discussion about individual-level
covariates can be found in Section 8 for the remainder of the main analysis, I include these
individual-level controls.
To understand the magnitude of this effect, I analyse females from different ends of Eastern
Paraguay. Based on the OLS estimates, a change from the lowest (0.002) to the highest (0.391)
value of the WID measure increases the likelihood of a female being subjected to any kind of
IPV by 29.25 percentage points (see Appendix C). This magnitude is substantial, as it is almost
the same as the estimated percentage of women worldwide who have been victims of IPV at
some point during their lifetime (30 percent; Garc´ıa-Moreno et al., 2013). These results suggest
that, more than 130 years later, the areas where the effect of the war was the highest are more
likely to exhibit substantially worse IPV outcomes over women’s lifetimes than areas where the
effect of the war was less severe.
7 Transmission Channels
Paraguayan demographics were severely affected by the war. However, these changes in
demographics were a temporary shock (see Figure 5). As a consequence, any evidence on the
long-term effect of the war on IPV cannot be explained by long-lasting changes in demographic
variables such as sex ratios or male survival rates. However, these long-term effects of the war
might be explained by the gender norms that emerged from this demographic shock. I then
analyse the roles of two opposing channels. Firstly, I examine whether male scarcity enabled
females’ labour participation and, consequently, females’ financial independence, which might,
in turn, lead to a reduction in IPV. Secondly, I examine whether male scarcity increased relative
female labour participation and relative female human capital accumulation, thus improving
the relative status of females within the household and, consequently, leading to higher levels of
IPV. I will refer to these channels as the financial independence channel and the relative status
channel, respectively.
To corroborate whether any of these channels are at play, I analyse the relationship between
demographics and gender norms emerging after the war and current levels of IPV. The demo-
graphics include female-biased sex ratios and male survival rates. I then examine the role of
gender differences in historical human capital and labour participation.26
26In Appendix G.2, I analyse the role of fertility after the war in the proposed transmission channels.
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7.1 The Role of Demographics
Female-Biased Sex Ratios The war left Paraguay with four to five females per male, which
defined it as the ‘country of women’ (Whigham and Potthast, 1999). Female-biased sex ratios
can have a persistent effect as they influence gender norms. In contexts of female-biased sex
ratios, males improve their position in the marriage market (Abramitzky et al., 2011) and females
replace them in the labour market (Goldin, 1991; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Goldin and Olivetti,
2013). Data limitations preclude me from testing the first finding.27 Institutional changes where
females are deemed unfit to perform certain economic activities or hold certain roles within
society would prevent this second relationship from holding (Capdevila, 2010). This would
result in women having less financial independence and a poorer status within the household,
which, in turn, is associated with higher and lower levels of IPV, respectively (Macmillan and
Gartner, 1999; Aizer, 2010; Abramsky et al., 2019). However, in Section 5, I show an increase in
female labour participation after the war despite institutional barriers. We would expect this to
have the opposite outcome. Females with more financial independence are allowed to negotiate
change within or leave an abusive relationship and, consequently, are less prone to IPV. Women
making more of a financial contribution to the household improve their relative status within
the household, which is perceived as a threat by their partner, and this is usually associated
with higher risks of IPV since males’ inability to provide becomes a cause of conflict.
I explore whether female-biased sex ratios explain the long-lasting effects of the war on IPV.
To do so, I perform two analyses. Firstly, I examine whether the female-biased sex ratio has a
long-term effect on contemporary levels of IPV where the sign of the estimate would validate one
of the channels described. If the financial independence channel dominates, I should observe
a negative relationship between historical female-biased sex ratios and current levels of IPV.
Otherwise, the relative status channel dominates. Secondly, I analyse whether the effect of WID
on IPV is absorbed once I control for the female-biased sex ratios.
To see whether the female-biased sex ratios after the war explain current levels of IPV and
the direction of the effect I use the following empirical specification:
P (IPVijk = 1 |MFRk, Xijk) = 1 (β1 MFRk +X ′ijk∆ ≥ εijk), (2)
where MFRk male/female ratio, i.e. the ratio of men to women, aged 12-50, in municipality k
for the year 1870. εijk are individual error terms clustered at the municipality-level. Similar to
the main specification, the outcomes are expressed in binary form.
I also analyse whether there the male/female sex ratio has a long-term impact on IPV and
27The main limitation is that the marriage market data I have access to is too incomplete for me to perform this
analysis
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whether this effect absorbs the effect of WID on IPV.
P (IPVijk = 1 |WIDjk, MFRk, Xijk) = 1 (β1WIDjk + β2 MFRk +X ′ijk∆ ≥ εijk). (3)
However, since the 1870 Census is only available for 33 observations, I also perform the analysis
using data from the 1886 Census. With the 1886 Census, I distinguish people according to their
age and participation in the war. I perform the analysis only for the people who were born
before the war and were exposed to compulsory drafting (ages 31+ in 1886, 12+ in 1868).
In Table 7 Panel (A) and (C), I present the marginal effects of the male/female sex ratio
in 1870 and 1886—respectively—on IPV. Almost all effects are positive and significant. An
increase in one standard deviation of the male/female ratio in 1886, which is equal to 0.119,
increases the likelihood of a female being subjected to any kind of IPV by 1.86 percentage
points. These results suggest that the higher the male/female ratio—the less female-biased the
sex ratios—the more likely it is for a female to be subjected to IPV. This suggests that the more
female-biased the sex ratio, the more financially independent females are, the less likely they are
to be subjected to IPV, as women who are more financially independent are more likely to be
able to negotiate within the potentially abusive relationship or to leave. In any of these cases,
IPV is transmitted across generations (Pollak, 2004).
In Table 7 Panels (B) and (D), I analyse whether the effect of the war on IPV I measured in
Table 6 is through male/female sex ratios. As a benchmark, I present marginal effects estimates
of WID on IPV restricting the sample to the women in municipalities for which I have such
historical data. The coefficients in column (4) of Panels (B) and (D) show that one standard
deviation increase in WID—0.037 (1870) and 0.015 (1886)—increases the females’ likelihood
of being subjected to any kind of IPV by 2.60 and 1.46 percentage points, respectively. These
estimates are reduced to 2.35 and 0.93 when the male/female sex ratio is included. The inclusion
of these controls absorbs 9.40 percent and 36.58 percent of the effect, suggesting that 9.40
percent and 36.58 percent of the effect of the war on IPV arises from an effect of female-biased
sex ratios.28 However, I show in the subsequent sections that the historical persistence of the
war not only arises from female-biased sex ratios, as conventional wisdom suggests. Moreover,
despite absorbing part of the main effect—of WID on IPV—the financial independence channel
corroborated by this evidence is outweighed by the opposing channel (see Section 7.3).
28The reason why the effect of WID on IPV is absorbed by the inclusion of the female-biased sex ratios regressor,
despite the fact that the relationship of WID and female-biased sex ratios with IPV have opposite signs, is
because the regressor used to capture female-biased sex ratios is male/female sex ratios. The sign of the
relationship of WID and male/female sex ratios with IPV is the same, i.e. positive. The inclusion of male/female
sex ratios thus absorbs the effect of WID on IPV, and therefore, the female-biased sex ratios do the same.
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Male Survival Rates In a context where females are considered unfit to perform any roles
but agriculture and home production, the male loss of life can deeply affect the social structure.
In this scenario, the relative male scarcity would not drive the changes in the social structure—
since females cannot replace males in certain positions—but the absolute loss of male life will.
Male survival rates (MSR) are appropriate measures of absolute male scarcity; higher MSR
implies a lower degree of male scarcity and vice versa. Before the war, Paraguayan women were
heads of households, meaning they held a position of power and authority (Ganson, 1990). After
the war, females were relegated to subsistence activities. If females are not allowed to perform
certain economic activities required given the size of a municipality’s population, those positions
might remain vacant until a man can fill them. Moreover, in these contexts, females were/are
less likely to be financially independent—associated with higher levels of IPV—and less likely to
contribute more to the household—associated with lower IPV. However, after the war, there was
an increase in female labour participation, both in absolute terms and relative to male labour
participation (see Section 5). If male survival rates are low—the absolute loss of male lives is
severe—female labour participation would increase as predicted by the literature despite the
institutional barrier. Females would perform traditionally male tasks making them more likely
to be financially independent—lower IPV—and more likely to make a larger contribution to
the household, which improves their status within that household—higher IPV. If the financial
independence channel dominates, I should observe a positive relationship between male survival
rates and current levels of IPV. Otherwise, the relative status channel dominates.
I then examine whether MSR has a direct long-term effect on IPV and its sign to check
whether it corroborates any of the transmission channels. To do so, I regress
P (IPVijk = 1 |MSRk, Xijk) = 1 (β1MSRk +X ′ijk∆ ≥ εijk) (4)
where MSRk are male survival rates, and k denotes an assumption regarding pre-war sex ratios,
(1) unbiased or (2) female-biased.29
I also examine whether the effect of WID on IPV is absorbed once I control for MSR. I
29I calculate the adult male population in 1846 under two scenarios (1) unbiased sex ratios before the war and
(2) the worst female-biased sex ratios for which the literature provides evidence (44 percent of males). I project
the adult male population of 1867/1868—depending on the year of the record—by using the adult population
by municipality from Williams (1976) and the calculated growth rate between the 1793 Census (Kleinpenning,
2003) and the 1846 Census. In the cases where no information about a municipality is available in the 1846
Census (i.e., Belen), I use the last available census shown in Kleinpenning (2003). Similarly, in the cases where
there is no information on a municipality available in 1793, I use the growth rate from Whigham and Potthast
(1999) of 1.75 percent per year. I divide the total number of draft-eligible males per municipality by the
projected populations. I end up with two measures for each municipality, one corresponding to the case where
I assumed unbiased pre-war sex ratios and one to the case where I assumed Paraguay had a severe—in terms
of the literature—female-biased sex ratio before the war.
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estimate the following:
P (IPVijk = 1 |WIDjkMSRk, Xijk) = 1 (β1WIDjk + β2MSRk +X ′ijk∆ ≥ εijk). (5)
In Table 8 Panel (A), I present the marginal effects of MSR on IPV assuming unbiased pre-
war sex ratios. All estimates of IPV are negative, significant and largely unaffected by a change
in the assumption regarding pre-war bias in the sex ratios (see Table F.1).
According to these results, an increase in one standard deviation of MSR No GI in 1868
(0.077) reduces the likelihood of a female being subjected to any kind of IPV today by 1.34
percentage points. These results suggest that there are negative long-term effects of male survival
rates of the Paraguayan War on IPV. The higher the male survival rate in a municipality, the
less likely it is that women will be subjected to any kind of violence 138 years after the end of
the war. This evidence validates the relative status channel.
In Panel (B), I present logit estimates for the effect of WID on IPV controlling for male
survival rates and unbiased pre-war sex ratios. As a baseline, in columns (1) to (4), I present
the estimates of the main analysis for the restricted sample. The coefficients of the WID measure
are non-significant in all specifications. This suggests that the effect of the war on IPV is driven
by the observations excluded from the sample for data availability reasons. However, in the
specifications presented in columns (5) to (8), I present results that suggest that male survival
rates are a transmission channel, since the effect of MSR No GI on any kind of IPV becomes non-
significant once I include the WID measure in the analysis. Unfortunately, the data limitations
presented prevent me from quantifying the extent to which the absolute loss of male life channel
affectscontemporary levels of IPV. Nevertheless, in light of the main result (see Section 7.3),
I argue that the evidence presented here suggests that the relative status is the main channel
driving the overall long-term effect.
7.2 The Role of Human Capital and Labour Participation
School Attendance Since changes in demographics are not persistent, long-term effects can-
not be purely driven by them. I then investigate whether the long-run effect of the Paraguayan
War on IPV can be explained by the transmission of specific attitudes towards females. I focus
on human capital investments in males, both in absolute and relative terms with respect to their
female counterparts, since males’ lack of education—both in absolute and relative terms—has
an effect on the perception of the relative status of the members of a household, which is a
known risk factor of IPV.
To quantify the gender differences in human capital investments after the war, I use the data
on children out of school by gender provided in the 1886 Statistical Yearbook. I use the total
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number of boys and the total number of girls out of school to calculate the out-of-school rates
(OSR) for both genders separately. I also construct a variable that represents how many boys
out of school there are per girl out of school. With this variable, I aim to capture the lack of
education of boys relative to girls. Children out of school means children who are not enrolled
in any school in 1886. These children are typically illiterate.
OSRBoys =
# Boys in School
# Boys
(6)
OSRGirls =
# Girls in School
# Girls
(7)
OSRRatio =
OSRBoys
OSRGirls
. (8)
Historians have pointed out that females were expected to be dedicated only to subsistence
activities after the war while the few remaining males were dedicated to rebuilding the insti-
tutional structure of the country. Consequently, the return on female human capital is lower.
However, these differences in returns to education did not hinder girls’ human capital after the
war (see Section 5). Similar to contexts where females make a bigger financial contribution,
when males are less educated than their partners IPV is also more prevalent (Macmillan and
Gartner, 1999).
To identify whether gender differences in schooling corroborate the relative status channel,
I analyse whether the three measures of out-of-school rates have a long-run effect on IPV by
estimating the following specification:
P (IPVijk = 1 |OSRmk , Xijk) = 1 (β1OSRmk +X ′ijkγ ≥ εijk), (9)
where OSRmk is one of three measures of out-of-school rates in municipality k. I use out-
of-school rates for girls, for all children, and the ratio between girls and boys out of school,
m ∈ {Girls,Boys,Ratio}.
I then examine whether the inclusion of the out-of-school control absorbs the effect of WID
on IPV. To do so, I use the following two empirical specifications:
P (IPVijk = 1 |WIDjk, OSRmk , Xijk) = 1 (β1WIDjk + β2OSRmk +X ′ijkγ ≥ εijk) (10)
In Table 9 Panels (A), (C) and (E), I examine the long-term effects of out-of-school rates—
both absolute and relative—on IPV. Almost all gender-specific coefficients are non-significant.
However, coefficients associated with the gender differences in out-of-school rates are positive
and significant, which suggests that the lower the historical gender differences in human capital,
the higher the current levels of IPV.30
30A higher ratio implies lower differences since the OSR were much higher for girls than for boys.
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In Table 9 Panels (B), (D) and (F), I analyse the effect of WID on IPV, controlling for the
three measures of out-of-school rates. I find that the WID coefficients change significantly on
inclusion of OSRBoys and OSRRatio. The inclusion of each of these variables reduces the effect
of an increase of one standard deviation in WID (0.028) from 1.71 percentage points to 1.63 and
1.44 percentage points, respectively. These reductions represent 4.68 percent and 15.79 percent
of the overall effect. These results suggest that the relative education of males plays a role as
a transmission channel. This evidence corroborates the hypothesis that the long-term effects
of the war are transmitted through a particular type of gender norm. In municipalities where
males are less educated, relative to their female counterparts, the effects of the war in terms of
IPV resonate in the long run.31
Female Labour Participation After the war, Paraguayan females were declared unfit to
participate in the labour market (Capdevila, 2010). One exemption to this were teachers. The
few available professions for females outside the household, according to the 1886 Statistical
Yearbook, were the following: laundress, seamstress, plachadoras (women who iron clothes),
teachers and midwives. However, the only available profession for both males and females
simultaneously was teaching. In 1886, 146 females were teachers in Paraguay compared to 300
of their male counterparts.
In Section 5, I show that in municipalities more severely affected by the war, females replaced
males in the only profession where they were able to do so. I then examine whether female labour
participation after the war has a direct long-term effect on IPV and whether the sign of the
estimates would allow me to infer which channel dominates. If the direct effects are positive, then
they would corroborate that municipalities that saw an increase in female labour participation—
both in absolute and relative terms—generated gender norms that enabled IPV. Otherwise, they
would corroborate that in municipalities where female labour participation increased after the
war, the emerging gender norm was that females were financially independent, which implies
that women were/are less likely to be subjected to IPV.
I also analyse whether female labour participation after the war can explain the long-term
effects of the war on IPV. Similar to the analysis presented in previous sections, I compare the
estimates of WID in the restricted sample for which the historical data is available with and
without controlling for female labour participation, in absolute and relative terms.
I calculate the number of teachers per child attending school for both genders and examine
whether female labour participation—both in absolute and relative terms with respect to males—
has an effect on current levels of IPV and whether the effect of WID on IPV can be explained
31If OSRGirls is included, WID coefficients remain largely unaltered. This suggests that girls’ lack of education
is not what is captured by the WID coefficients.
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by female labour participation. I then regress
P (IPVijk = 1 |Zk, Xijk) = 1 (β1 Zk +X ′ijk∆ ≥ εijk). (11)
P (IPVijk = 1 |WIDjk, Zk, Xijk) = 1 (β1WIDjk + β2 Zk +X ′ijk∆ ≥ εijk). (12)
where Z = {FTPC, (MTPC − FTPC)} and FTPC and MTPC are the number of female
and male teachers per child attending school, respectively.
In Table 10, I present the estimates for Equations (11) and (12) for both outcomes. In Panel
(A) and (C), I provide the estimates for the effect of FTPC and (MTPC-FTPC) on IPV, respec-
tively. All estimates presented in Panels (A) are non-significant. In Panel (B), the coefficients
associated with emotional and any kind of IPV are negative and significant. This suggests that
there is a positive long-term effect of the gender differences in labour participation on emotional
IPV. Moreover, this sign suggests that in municipalities with lower gender differences in labour
participation, after the war gender norms arose allowing females to make larger financial con-
tributions to the household, thus making them more likely to be subjected to IPV and transmit
it to future generations.
In Panels (B) and (D), I provide estimates of the effects of WID on IPV controlling for
FTPC and (MTPC-FTPC), respectively. I show that the estimates for the effect of WID on
IPV are largely unaltered by the inclusion of the female labour participation regressor (FTPC).
These results suggest that the effect of WID on IPV does not occur through changes in female
labour participation in absolute terms after the war. However, the inclusion of (MTPC-FTPC)
reduces the effect of an increase in one standard deviation of WID (0.028) from 1.71 percentage
points to 1.57 percentage points. This reduction represents 8.19 percent of the overall effect of
the war on current levels of IPV. Meanwhile, the coefficients associated with (MTPC-FTPC)
remain largely unaltered. Similar to the results presented on the roles of male survival rates
and out-of-school rates, these results corroborate that gender differences in labour participation
after the war play a role as part of the relative status channel of the effect of the war on IPV.
7.3 Discussion
In this paper, I have discussed and shown the mechanics behind the long-term effect of the war
on IPV. As demographics are not persistent, long-term effects cannot be purely driven by them. I
have shown that the gender norms that emerged in the aftermath of the war—and the subsequent
temporary demographic shock—can cause long-lasting effects as these are transmitted across
generations. Among many transmission channels that could be at play, I analysed two opposing
channels that reflect some of these emerging norms, the financial independence channel and the
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relative status channel. Figure 9 depicts these transmission mechanics. The use of the signs of
the statistically significant coefficients sheds light on which channel dominates.
I found evidence of a direct and negative long-term effect of male survival rates on levels of
IPV. This suggests that the absolute loss of male life enabled females’ relative labour participa-
tion and human capital. This improved women’s status within the household, a risk factor for
IPV, which corroborates the relative status channel.
I also found that historical gender differences in labour participation have a negative effect
on IPV in the long run. This implies that lower gender differences in labour market participation
is compatible with a higher likelihood of females making a relatively larger contribution to the
household, and therefore with a higher likelihood of being subjected to IPV. Moreover, results
associated with the gender differences in historical lack of education are in line with a positive
effect of relative status within the household on IPV. In municipalities where there is a higher
rate of uneducated boys relative to girls, there is a higher likelihood of IPV in the long run.
Similar to the case where females contribute more to the household, males being less educated
than their partners is an IPV risk factor. Once I include these specific regressors, they absorb
8.19 percent and 15.79 percent of the main effect, respectively. These results are evidence that
female-biased sex ratios alone do not explain the long-lasting effects of the war on IPV.
These results are in line with the idea of traditional gender roles where the male is considered
the breadwinner. In the context of this paper, the threat of losing this traditional role due to
a demographic shock reducing the gender differences in the labour market is shown to be a
risk factor of IPV that is transmitted over time. However, income is one of the many status
inconsistencies that are usually conceptualised in the literature. Other status inconsistencies
presented are education and occupation (Macmillan and Gartner, 1999).
Additionally, I have shown the importance of an alternative and less dominant channel,
namely the financial independence channel. I have shown that 36.58 percent of the long-term
effect of WID on IPV is absorbed by the inclusion of the female-biased sex ratio regressor. In
municipalities more severely affected by the war, the emerging female-biased sex ratio increased
female labour participation despite institutional steps that declared them unfit to do so. This
allowed females to be financially independent, which improved their negotiation abilities within
the marriage or their chances of being able to leave an abusive relationship. Overall, this reduced
the likelihood of females being subjected to IPV and transmitting it to future generations.
I have shown evidence that effects present in the literature persist in the very long term.
Women in municipalities with higher historical female financial independence are less likely to
be subjected to IPV and women in municipalities where females have historically had a better
status within the household—in terms of relative human capital and labour participation—are
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more likely to be subjected to IPV. Given that the war has a positive long-term effect on IPV,
the relative status channel outweighs the financial independence channel.
8 Robustness Checks
A concern regarding the main results presented in Section 6 is the possible underreporting
of IPV. By interpreting these results as a lower bound for the long-term effects of the war on
IPV today I aim to alleviate these concerns.
An additional concern is an alternative interpretation of these results, as the Paraguayan
War could have led to changes that affected all types of interpersonal violence, making society
more violent in general. In light of this alternative account, I analyse the long-term effects of
the war on interpersonal crime using administrative data on personal crimes per 100 inhabitants
(homicides, child abuse, injuries/assaults, rape and family violence). In this analysis, I control
for measures of poverty and inequality—Gini, average family income, poverty (%) and poverty
gap—since income is considered to protect females from IPV. I also control for the current sex
ratios at the municipality level, since I want to isolate the historical effects from a potential
contemporaneous effect.32
In Table 11, I show evidence contrary to this alternative account. I show positive and
significant coefficients of the long-term effects of the war on personal crimes related to gender,
rape and family violence. Furthermore, I show insignificant coefficients of the effects of the war
on personal crimes not directly related to gender. Consistent with the gender norms emerging
in the aftermath of the war, these results confirm that the long-term effects of the war on gender
norms are not driven by an overall increase in violence in Paraguay. Moreover, these results
remain unaltered by the inclusion of the demographic, inequality and poverty controls.
In Appendix C, I present additional robustness checks. Firstly, I check whether a different
functional form of the distance to the military camps would alter the results. The results still
hold when the measure used is the weighted distance squared.33 Secondly, I check whether
provincial institutional differences would alter the results. To do so, I add province fixed effects
and the results remain unaltered. Thirdly, I check whether the results are robust to a change
in the clustering level from neighbourhood to a historical municipality. The significance of the
results is unaltered by this change. Lastly, a potential concern is the effects of current levels
of female human capital and labour participation on IPV. To address this I include education
and labour participation controls. Despite the potential endogeneity of these variables, since the
32The analysis is performed at the municipality level except for Asuncio´n, where it is performed at the neigh-
bourhood level.
33The functional form used is WIDsquaredjk =
∑5
c=1
1
(DistToCampcjk)
2 ∗ SizeOfCampc,.
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shock itself led to higher levels of female human capital and labour participation, the inclusion of
these controls is a useful robustness check. Results remain largely unaltered. They only become
insignificant with the inclusion of the working outside the household regressor, conditional on
the respondent working. However, since these controls are highly endogenous, I exclude them
from the rest of the analysis.
In addition and to validate the relevance of my findings, I show that female labour participa-
tion is higher in municipalities more severely affected both in the aftermath of the war—16 years
later—and more than 130 years later (see Appendix D). This is consistent with the literature
on the short- and long-term effects of female-biased sex ratios (Goldin, 1991; Acemoglu et al.,
2004; Goldin and Olivetti, 2013; Teso, 2018). This implies that the Paraguayan case can inform
the debate on how demographic shocks affect gender norms.
9 Conclusion
This paper shows the persistent effects of a historical shock that affects demographics and
gender norms on IPV. Today, more than 100 years later, the impact of the Paraguayan War still
resonates. I show that females who live in areas that were historically more severely affected by
the war are more likely to be subjected to IPV. The magnitude of this increase is 1.89 percentage
points if the WID measure increases by one standard deviation. This implies that IPV is 5.54
percent more likely than average in municipalities that were more severely affected by the war
in the long run.
The findings presented in this paper show the importance of historical events in under-
standing the determinants of gender norms, their long-term persistence and consequences. The
gender norms that emerged after the demographic shock caused by the war have enabled vio-
lence against women and, specifically, IPV. Using a historical natural experiment such as the
Paraguayan War allows us to understand the roots of this type of violent event, enabling the
development of economic policies against it.
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Tables
Table 1: Female-Biased Sex Ratios in the Literature
Historical Event Date Description Male/Female Ratio
Slave Trade*
late C18th West Africa, whole population 0.70
late 1770s Angola, whole population 0.65
late 1770s Angola, adults 0.50
Paraguayan War**
1870 Eastern Paraguay, whole population 0.540
1870 Eastern Paraguay, fertile population 0.338
1886 Eastern Paraguay, draft age population 0.306
Post-War Russia***
1959 Age 18–44 (year of birth 1915–1941) 0.796
* General estimates provided by Manning (1990) and Miller (1988), retrieved from Teso (2018),
** Data by municipality retrieved from Whigham and Potthast (1999) and the 1886 Statistical Yearbook,
*** Data from 1959 by single year of age retrieved from Brainerd (2017).
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Table 2: Historical Data Sources
Type Date Level Description Source
Population 1846 Municipality (69) Total population stratified by age groups* Williams (1976)
Population 1870 Municipality (34) Total population stratified by gender Whigham and Potthast (1999)
and age groups*
Population 1886 Municipality (88) Total population stratified by gender Statistical Yearbook of the
and age groups* Paraguayan Republic**
Military camps 1864 – Location and sizes Thompson (1869)
Draft eligible males 1868 Individual (11081) Total male population (age 12+) in 45 Own collection***
municipalities
Out-of-school rates 1886 Municipality (88) Total child population stratified by Statistical Yearbook of the
gender and school attendance**** Paraguayan Republic**
Teachers 1886 Municipality (88) Total population stratified by gender Statistical Yearbook of the
Paraguayan Republic**
*Age groups are more disaggregated in 1886 compared to 1846 and 1870. This higher disaggregation allows me to identify the generation exposed
to compulsory drafting.
**Anuario Estadistico de las Republica del Paraguay (1886).
***Data is at the individual level but used in this paper at the municipality level. For more details, see Boggiano (2020).
****Children are classified as children enrolled in school as well as children out of the school system.
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Table 3: Paraguayan Municipalities in 1860 (Kleinpenning, 2003).
ID Name ID Name ID Name
1 Salvador 33 Pirayu 65 Oliva
2 Aquidaban 34 Ytaugua 66 Ybucui
3 Concepcion 35 Aregua 67 Caazapa
4 Belen 36 Luque 68 San Juan Nepomuceno
5 Horqueta 37 Limpio 69 Yuty
6 Tacuati 38 Asuncion - Santisima Trinidad 70 Mbuyapey
7 Lima 39 Asuncion - Recoleta 71 San Isidro
8 San Pedro 40 Asuncion - Catedral + Encarnacion 72 Quiquyo
9 Rosario 41 Asuncion - San Roque 73 Caacupu
10 San Estanislao 42 Lambare 74 Villa Franca
11 Carimbatai 43 Capiata - Aldana y Toledo 75 San Juan Bautista
12 Curuguaty 44 San Lorenzo del C Grande 76 San Miguel
13 Igatimi 45 San Lorenzo de la Frontera 77 Santa Maria
14 Yhu 46 San Antonio 78 Santa Rosa
15 Caaguazu 47 Ypane 79 San Ignacio
16 Ajos 48 Capiata 80 Tacuaras
17 Carayao 49 Rojas y Yatayty 81 Pilar
18 San Joaquin 50 Guarambare 82 Guazu-Cua
19 Union 51 Ita 83 Isla Umbu
20 Caraguatay 52 Villeta 84 Pedro Gonzalez
21 Arroyos y Esteros 53 Carapegua 85 Desmochados
22 Occidental 54 Yaguaron 86 Laureles
23 Emboscada 55 Paraguari 87 Yabebiri
24 Altos 56 Hiati 88 Santiago
25 Atyra 57 Yataiti 89 San Cosme
26 Tobati 58 Mbocayaty 90 Bobi
27 Barrero Grande 59 Villa Rica 91 San Pedro del Parana
28 Ytacuribi 60 Y(h)acanguazu 92 Carmen del Parana
29 San Jose de los Arroyos 61 Itape 93 Jesus
30 Valenzuela 62 Ybitimi 94 Trinidad
31 Piribebuy 63 Acahay 95 Encarnacion
32 Caacupe 64 Quiindi
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Table 4: Paraguayan Population and Distances to Military Camps
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male/female ratio*
Whole population (1870) 34 0.540 0.187 0.202 1.12
Fertile population (1870) 33 0.338 0.190 0.052 2.00
Drafted population (1886) 88 0.313 0.120 0.132 0.735
Draft-eligible males**
Lists of draft-eligible males (1867/1868) 45 250.178 153.140 21 562
Distances***
To Cerro Leon (in km) 9,161 147.409 101.689 8.566 370.136
WID (Cont. data) 9,161 0.0150 0.027 0.002 0.391
WID (Hist. data) 88 0.0137 0.014 0.004 0.109
*Whigham and Potthast (1999), Statistical Yearbook (1886),
** Own elaboration using data from the Archivo Nacional de Asuncion,
***Own elaboration using data from the Cartography Department of the DGEEC.
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Table 5: Sociodemographics of the Sample Population
Variables n % N
Age
15-19 503 5.59% 9161
20-24 1510 16.48% 9161
25-29 1987 21.59% 9161
30-34 1948 21.26% 9161
35-39 1755 19.17% 9161
40-44 1467 16.01% 9161
Educational attainment
None 173 1.89% 9161
Primary 4752 51.87% 9161
High school 2858 31.20% 9161
College or more 1378 15.04% 9161
Marital status
Consensual union 3935 42.95% 9161
Married 4492 49.03% 9161
Widowed 83 0.91% 9161
Separated 621 6.78% 9161
Divorced 30 0.33% 9161
Childhood violence
Witnessed 2057 22.52% 9161
Suffered 1554 16.96% 9161
IPV
Emotional 2880 31.44 % 9161
Physical 1,553 16.95% 9161
Sexual 564 6.16% 9161
Any kind 3120 34.06% 9161
Source: Own elaboration using data from ENDSSR-2004 and ENDSSR-2008.
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Table 6: WID on IPV (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
Marginal effects 1.020*** 0.540*** 0.275*** 1.134*** 0.614*** 0.354** 0.252*** 0.698***
(WID) (0.271) (0.154) (0.0658) (0.325) (0.207) (0.141) (0.0675) (0.256)
N 9161 9161 9160 9161 9161 9161 9160 9161
Ind. level controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 .003 .0021 .0034 .0033 .0131 .0085 .0074 .0135
Number of clusters 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503
Dep. var. mean 0.314 0.170 0.0616 0.341 0.314 0.170 0.0616 0.341
Dep. var. st. dev. 0.464 0.375 0.240 0.474 0.464 0.375 0.240 0.474
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Individual-level controls include age, area (urban/rural) and whether the female speaks Spanish.
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Table 7: Female-Biased Sex Ratios on IPV (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
(A) 1870
Marginal effects - - - - 0.0556** 0.0338** 0.0165** 0.0571*
(Male/female ratio) (0.0263) (0.0143) (0.00710) (0.0314)
N - - - - 4086 4086 4086 4086
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - .0095 .0048 .006 .0102
Number of clusters - - - - 21 21 21 21
(B) 1870
Marginal effects 0.608*** 0.426*** 0.291*** 0.702** 0.543** 0.392** 0.278*** 0.636**
(WID) (0.224) (0.160) (0.0785) (0.281) (0.218) (0.159) (0.0802) (0.274)
Marginal effects - - - - 0.0448 0.0259 0.0109 0.0445
(Male/female ratio) (0.0277) (0.0226) (0.0128) (0.0292)
N 4086 4086 4086 4086 4086 4086 4086 4086
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 .0102 .0061 .0104 .0113 .0108 .0065 .0107 .0119
Number of clusters 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215
ρ (WID, MFR1870) 0.1839
St. dev. WID 0.0369
(C) 1886 (IV)
Marginal effects - - - - 0.160*** 0.0744* 0.0295 0.156**
(Male/female ratio) (0.0528) (0.0403) (0.0278) (0.0667)
N - - - - 7739 7739 7739 7739
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - 0.013 0.008 0.006 0.013
Number of clusters - - - - 38 38 38 38
(D) 1886 (IV)
Marginal effects 0.929*** 0.415 0.0811 0.973*** 0.552* 0.238 -0.00341 0.617*
(WID) (0.299) (0.271) (0.101) (0.339) (0.306) (0.285) (0.111) (0.353)
Marginal effects - - - - 0.133** 0.0620 0.0297 0.125*
(Male/female ratio) (0.0558) (0.0419) (0.0305) (0.0716)
N 7739 7739 7739 7739 7739 7739 7739 7739
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.006 0.014
Number of clusters 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
ρ (WID, MFR1886) 0.3409
St. dev. WID (1886) 0.0155
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note: Individual-level controls include age, area (urban/rural) and whether the female speaks Spanish.
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Table 8: Male Survival Rates on IPV (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
(A)
Marginal effects - - - - -0.100 -0.174*** -0.0167 -0.174**
(MSR No GI) (0.0794) (0.0530) (0.0396) (0.0778)
N - - - - 4358 4358 4358 4358
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - 0.012 0.010 0.004 0.013
Number of clusters - - - - 20 20 20 20
(B)
Marginal effects -0.186 0.346 -0.188 0.0741 -0.114 0.490 -0.175 0.198
(WID) (1.270) (1.218) (0.425) (1.343) (1.271) (1.193) (0.424) (1.337)
Marginal effects - - - - -0.0990 -0.180* -0.0149 -0.176
(MSR No GI) (0.108) (0.0959) (0.0515) (0.111)
N 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 .0123 .0087 .0039 .0125 .0125 .01 .0039 .0131
Number of clusters 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280
ρ 0.0163
St. dev. WID 0.0084
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Individual-level controls include age, area (urban/rural) and whether the female speaks Spanish.
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Table 9: Out of School Rates on IPV (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
(A)
Marginal effects - - - - 0.0430 0.0196 0.0177 0.0377
(OSR Boys) (0.0383) (0.0232) (0.0145) (0.0414)
N - - - - 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.012
Number of clusters - - - - 38 38 38 38
(B)
Marginal effects 0.529** 0.345** 0.245*** 0.610** 0.494* 0.334** 0.235*** 0.583**
(WID) (0.252) (0.138) (0.0451) (0.288) (0.252) (0.137) (0.0480) (0.287)
Marginal effects - - - - 0.0294 0.00952 0.0103 0.0218
(OSR Boys) (0.0366) (0.0206) (0.0140) (0.0387)
N 7805 7805 7804 7805 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.013
Number of clusters 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
ρ (WID,OSR Boys) 0.1505
(C)
Marginal effects - - - - -0.0108 -0.0172 0.0288* -0.0363
(OSR Girls) (0.0457) (0.0300) (0.0156) (0.0511)
N - - - - 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.012
Number of clusters - - - - 38 38 38 38
(D)
Marginal effects 0.529** 0.345** 0.245*** 0.610** 0.530** 0.348*** 0.236*** 0.612**
(WID) (0.252) (0.138) (0.0451) (0.288) (0.244) (0.129) (0.0383) (0.258)
Marginal effects - - - - -0.0125 -0.0195 0.0268* -0.0384
(OSR Girls) (0.0438) (0.0283) (0.0138) (0.0488)
N 7805 7805 7804 7805 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.009 0.013
Number of clusters 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
ρ (WID,OSR Girls) -0.0912
(E)
Marginal effects - - - - 0.0412* 0.0251* -0.00135 0.0516**
(OSR Ratio) (0.0233) (0.0138) (0.00698) (0.0258)
N - - - - 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.013
Number of clusters - - - - 38 38 38 38
(F)
Marginal effects 0.529** 0.345** 0.245*** 0.610** 0.456** 0.308** 0.254*** 0.514**
(WID) (0.252) (0.138) (0.0451) (0.288) (0.210) (0.122) (0.0369) (0.231)
Marginal effects - - - - 0.0320 0.0186 -0.00675 0.0413*
(OSR Ratio) (0.0225) (0.0131) (0.00750) (0.0249)
N 7805 7805 7804 7805 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.014
Number of clusters 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
ρ (WID,OSR Ratio) 0.2422
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Individual-level controls include age, area (urban/rural) and whether the female speaks Spanish.
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Table 10: Female Labour Participation in 1886 on IPV (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
(A)
Marginal effects - - - - 0.222 -0.161 -0.502 0.157
(FTPC) (1.734) (1.303) (0.560) (1.986)
N - - - - 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.012
Number of clusters - - - - 38 38 38 38
(B)
Marginal effects 0.529** 0.345** 0.245*** 0.610** 0.533** 0.352*** 0.251*** 0.616**
(WID) (0.252) (0.138) (0.0451) (0.288) (0.255) (0.135) (0.0337) (0.291)
Marginal effects - - - - -0.179 -0.427 -0.678 -0.306
(FTPC) (1.686) (1.260) (0.573) (1.909)
N 7805 7805 7804 7805 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.013
Number of clusters 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
ρ (WID, FTPC) 0.4286
(C)
Marginal effects - - - - -1.279** -0.588 -0.250 -1.395*
(MTPC–FTPC) (0.636) (0.479) (0.234) (0.719)
N - - - - 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.013
Number of clusters - - - - 38 38 38 38
(D)
Marginal effects 0.529** 0.345** 0.245*** 0.610** 0.484** 0.328** 0.240*** 0.559**
(WID) (0.252) (0.138) (0.0451) (0.288) (0.223) (0.133) (0.0462) (0.255)
Marginal effects - - - - -1.153* -0.500 -0.183 -1.251*
(MTPC–FTPC) (0.618) (0.481) (0.232) (0.706)
N 7805 7805 7804 7805 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.014
Number of clusters 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
ρ (WID, MTPC − FTPC) 0.2489
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Individual-level controls include age, area (urban/rural) and whether the female speaks Spanish.
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Table 11: WID on personal crimes (OLS, administrative data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Homicide Child Injury/ Rape Family Homicide Child Injury/ Rape Family
abuse assault violence abuse assault violence
WID 0.187 0.0178 1.425 0.215*** 1.391** 0.184 0.0148 1.395 0.217*** 1.375**
(0.334) (0.0643) (0.958) (0.0506) (0.626) (0.319) (0.0744) (0.853) (0.0506) (0.569)
Gini -0.000269 -0.000665** -0.0201 -0.000317 -0.00450*** -0.000418 -0.000791** -0.0213 -0.000229 -0.00517***
(0.000788) (0.000287) (0.0134) (0.000208) (0.00123) (0.000883) (0.000361) (0.0142) (0.000192) (0.00141)
Poverty (%) -0.000463 0.00123* 0.0323 -0.000216 0.00372 0.000641 0.00217* 0.0416* -0.000871* 0.00875**
(0.00181) (0.000678) (0.0196) (0.000387) (0.00291) (0.00259) (0.00111) (0.0234) (0.000454) (0.00389)
Poverty gap 0.00187 -0.00174* -0.0571 0.000535 -0.00353 0.000382 -0.00301* -0.0696 0.00142* -0.0103*
(0.00273) (0.000888) (0.0359) (0.000752) (0.00423) (0.00372) (0.00150) (0.0417) (0.000771) (0.00565)
N 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283
Sex ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Av. family income No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adj. R2 .0196 .1868 .0808 .0067 .3429 .0196 .1941 .08 .0084 .3471
Number of clusters 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Dep. var. mean 0.0262 0.0117 0.175 0.0162 0.0942 0.0262 0.0117 0.175 0.0162 0.0942
Dep. var. st. dev. 0.0391 0.0197 0.390 0.0191 0.132 0.0391 0.0197 0.390 0.0191 0.132
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
(1) Population and Crime data was retrieved from the 2013 Paraguayan Criminological Atlas (Atlas Criminolo´gico de Paraguay).
(2) Crimes are weighted by 100 inhabitants.
(3) Poverty and income data were retrieved from Robles and Santander (2012).
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Figure 1: Timeline of the Paraguayan War (1864 - 1870).
Notes:
(1) The top part of the timeline depicts the main events during the Paraguayan War.
(2) The bottom part of the timeline depicts points in time over history when population measures were
generated.
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Figure 2: Paraguayan Municipalities (Kleinpenning, 2003).
Note:
(1) See details in Table 3.
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Figure 3: Contemporary Erotic Paintings, El Cabrion (January 1872).
Museo Militar de Asuncio´n, Capdevila (2010)
Notes:
(1) In the picture on the left, the male is taller and the female is looking up at him.
(2) In the picture in the centre, the man and the woman are both the same height. They appear to be more
poorly dressed than in the left-hand picture but they are still looking at each other.
(3) In the picture on the right, the female is taller than the male, who compensates for his lack of height with
a hat, she is looking down at him and he is not looking at her at all.
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Figure 4: Post-War Demographics and WID
Comments:
(i) Exposure to the compulsory draft leads to lower post-war male/female sex ratios, and lower male survival rates.
Notes:
(1) Hollow dots are considered outliers. The dashed line represents the linear prediction of the underlying
observations including outliers while the solid line does not include outliers.
(2) MFSR accounts for the male/female sex ratio among the drafted population in 1886 (group IV in Figure 5).
(3) MSR accounts for male survival rates in 1868.
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Figure 5: Gender Imbalance by Age Group (1886)
Notes:
(1) Age groups are depicted with different shades. Newborns being the lightest coloured group and the elderly
(adults above 71 years old) being the darkest.
(2) The numbering at the top depicts the relationship between the different age groups and the war. People
who belonged to groups I and II were born after the war. People who belonged to group III were born during
the war but were not old enough to be drafted, conditional on being male. People who belonged to group IV
were compulsorily drafted, conditional on being male and not medically discharged in 1868.
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Figure 6: WID and Post-War Human Capital and Female Labour Participation
Comments:
(i) Exposure to the compulsory draft leads to lower post-war levels of girls out of school (uneducated females),
gender differences in out-of-school rates, and differences between male and female teachers per child at school.
Meanwhile, it leads to higher levels of female teachers per child at school.
Notes:
(1) Hollow dots are considered outliers. The dashed line represents the linear prediction of the underlying
observations including outliers, while the solid line does not include outliers.
(2) Out-of-school rates indicate the share of children not attending school in a municipality in 1886, i.e., the
share of uneducated children. When the ratio is higher, gender differences are lower since OSR for girls are
much higher than for boys.
(3) FTPC and MTPC denote female and male teacher per child at school, respectively.
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Figure 7: Non-Compliance and WID
Comments:
(i) Exposure to the compulsory draft leads to lower non-compliance.
Notes:
(1) Hollow dots are considered outliers. The dashed line represents the linear prediction of the underlying
observations including outliers, while the solid line does not include outliers.
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Figure 8: Optimal Location of Military Camps (1864).
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Figure 9: Transmission Channels
Notes:
(1) The top part of each subfigure depicts the mechanics behind each transmission channel.
(2) The bottom part of each subfigure depicts the corroborating results found in the paper.
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A Balance of Power within the Rio de la Plata Basin
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Figure A.1: Timeline of Conflicts in the Rio de la Plata Basin (1800 - 1870)
Notes:
(1) The top part of the timeline depicts the historical periods that led to the Paraguayan War.
(2) The bottom part of the timeline depicts specific important events that defined these historical periods.
Paraguay (today Eastern Paraguay), the Argentine Confederation (Argentina), the Banda
Oriental (Uruguay) and Brazil are four nations that were obliged to to maintain a relationship
to a certain extent because they all depended on the Rio de la Plata Basin to reach the Atlantic
Trade Routes.34 This interdependency, their different views on fundamental political issues and
overlapping claims to territories led to 60 years of conflict. Figure A.1 summarises the main
events over the 1810–1870 period.
Since Paraguay’s Independence (1811), the country has been governed by three successive
dictatorships and has become the most industrialised and technologically advanced nation in
South America with virtually no recourse to slavery, foreign financing or investment.35 In
contrast, other countries in the region took 30 years to become more politically stable republics
which then began to integrate into the world’s economy driven by the industrialisation of the
US and Western Europe through a single export route via the Rio de la Plata. This route was
controlled from Buenos Aires and Montevideo allowing their administrations to supervise, tax
or plunder inbound and outbound shipments while Paraguay and the Matto Grosso province of
Brazil (north of Paraguay) were landlocked and had no direct control over their export routes.
The Paraguayan and Brazilian governments had incentives to exert influence, if and wherever
possible, over the governments of their neighbours. Figure A.2 shows a map of the political
divisions of South America at the start of the Wars of Independence (1810–1816).
Argentina became a unified country with centralised custom rights in 1861. This incentivised
the Argentine government to exert more control over the Rio de la Plata Basin to protect its
exports to Europe.36 Fearing isolation from the Atlantic Export Routes, Paraguay sought to help
Uruguay’s governing party overcome an opposition uprising in 1863 backed by Argentina and
34More detail about the impact of trade on international conflicts in the region in Pastore and Seiglie (2016).
35By 1863, Paraguay had developed the first iron foundry, the first railway line and the first electric telegraph
line in South America. The foundry operated until 3 May 1868 when Brazil demolished it (Reber, 1999).
36At the time, customs revenues were the main source of funds for the government (Villanueva, 2001).
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Figure A.2: Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata (1776 - 1810).
Brazil, allowing them to become actively involved in the conflict as well.37 Despite Paraguay’s
efforts, the Uruguayan government was ousted, and the new leaders joined Argentina and Brazil
in a Triple Alliance to move against Paraguay.
37There were two military factions: the conservative Blancos—who were backed by Paraguay and looked after
the agricultural interests of the countryside and promoted protectionism—and the liberal Colorados—who were
backed by Argentina and Brazil and represented the business interests of Montevideo. During this conflict, like
many other Uruguayan cities, Montevideo and its port were under siege by the Brazilian forces.
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Figure B.1: Optimal Location of Military Camps, 1864 (K-Medians Clustering, Kagler 1976).
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Figure B.2: Optimal Location of Military Camps, 1864 (K-Means Clustering, Williams 1976).
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C Additional Results
Table C.1: WID on IPV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
(A) Logit
WID 4.737*** 3.842*** 4.790*** 5.053*** 2.864*** 2.547** 4.461*** 3.121***
(1.255) (1.095) (1.153) (1.442) (0.965) (1.014) (1.193) (1.143)
Marginal effects 1.020*** 0.540*** 0.275*** 1.134*** 0.614*** 0.354** 0.252*** 0.698***
(0.271) (0.154) (0.0658) (0.325) (0.207) (0.141) (0.0675) (0.256)
pseudo R2 .003 .0021 .0034 .0033 .0131 .0085 .0074 .0135
(B) OLS
WID 1.105*** 0.663*** 0.413*** 1.196*** 0.678*** 0.444** 0.382*** 0.752***
(0.287) (0.206) (0.136) (0.328) (0.231) (0.192) (0.140) (0.274)
adj. R2 .0039 .0021 .002 .0044 .0158 .0073 .0034 .0168
(C) Logit - Distance Squared
WID (Dist.Sq.) 3.804** 2.939** 3.858*** 4.009** 2.617** 2.144** 3.677*** 2.743**
(1.490) (1.187) (0.918) (1.768) (1.108) (0.991) (0.890) (1.324)
Marginal effects 0.820** 0.413** 0.222*** 0.900** 0.561** 0.298** 0.208*** 0.614**
(0.322) (0.167) (0.0532) (0.398) (0.238) (0.138) (0.0510) (0.296)
pseudo R2 .0018 .0013 .0026 .0019 .0129 .0083 .007 .0132
(D) Logit with Province FE
WID 3.456*** 3.356*** 3.941*** 3.818*** 2.140** 2.257* 3.305** 2.525**
(1.069) (1.197) (1.297) (1.278) (1.016) (1.164) (1.366) (1.198)
Marginal effects 0.742*** 0.467*** 0.223*** 0.854*** 0.458** 0.312* 0.185** 0.564**
(0.229) (0.167) (0.0737) (0.286) (0.218) (0.161) (0.0768) (0.268)
pseudo R2 .0119 .0084 .007 .0132 .017 .0118 .0113 .0179
N 9161 9161 9160 9161 9161 9161 9160 9161
Ind. level controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of clusters 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503
Dep. var. mean 0.314 0.170 0.0616 0.341 0.314 0.170 0.0616 0.341
Dep. var. st. dev. 0.464 0.375 0.240 0.474 0.464 0.375 0.240 0.474
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.2: WID on IPV (with historical-municipality-level clustering)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
WID 4.737** 3.842*** 4.790*** 5.053** 2.864** 2.547** 4.461*** 3.121**
(2.182) (1.326) (0.521) (2.355) (1.368) (0.993) (0.627) (1.481)
Marginal effects 1.020** 0.540*** 0.275*** 1.134** 0.614** 0.354*** 0.252*** 0.698**
(0.469) (0.180) (0.0280) (0.528) (0.292) (0.134) (0.0364) (0.331)
N 9161 9161 9160 9161 9161 9161 9160 9161
Ind. level controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 .003 .0021 .0034 .0033 .0131 .0085 .0074 .0135
Number of clusters 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Dep. var. mean 0.314 0.170 0.0616 0.341 0.314 0.170 0.0616 0.341
Dep. var. st. dev. 0.464 0.375 0.240 0.474 0.464 0.375 0.240 0.474
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.3: WID on IPV (controlling for education and labour participation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
WID 2.878*** 2.659*** 4.579*** 3.154*** 2.398** 2.133** 4.161*** 2.662**
(0.964) (0.996) (1.122) (1.140) (0.958) (1.004) (1.164) (1.137)
Marginal effects 0.617*** 0.368*** 0.255*** 0.706*** 0.513** 0.292** 0.229*** 0.594**
(0.207) (0.138) (0.0623) (0.256) (0.205) (0.138) (0.0640) (0.254)
N 9161 9161 9160 9161 9161 9161 9160 9161
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Highest Educ. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Working No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 .0131 .0115 .0125 .0137 .0203 .0195 .0168 .0212
Number of clusters 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503
Dep. var. mean 0.314 0.170 0.0616 0.341 0.314 0.170 0.0616 0.341
Dep. var. st. dev 0.464 0.375 0.240 0.474 0.464 0.375 0.240 0.474
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table C.4: WID on IPV (controlling for working outside the household conditional on working)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
WID 1.496* 1.736* 3.776*** 1.793 1.370 1.489 3.324*** 1.642
(0.857) (0.982) (0.968) (1.094) (0.856) (0.971) (0.991) (1.086)
Marginal effects 0.352* 0.282* 0.243*** 0.433 0.322 0.241 0.208*** 0.396
(0.201) (0.160) (0.0609) (0.264) (0.201) (0.157) (0.0616) (0.262)
N 4003 4003 4003 4003 4003 4003 4003 4003
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Highest Educ. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Working Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
WOHH No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 .0079 .013 .022 .0095 .0087 .0156 .0307 .0106
Number of clusters 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487
Dep. var. mean 0.379 0.208 0.0739 0.408 0.379 0.208 0.0739 0.408
Dep. var. st. dev 0.485 0.406 0.262 0.492 0.485 0.406 0.262 0.492
Standard errors in parentheses,
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: WOHH stands for working outside the household.
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D Relevance
Effects of the War on Female Labour Participation
In this paper, I have shown evidence of the long-term impact of the Paraguayan War on IPV.
These results are relevant provided that the Paraguayan case is not exceptional. To address this,
I analyse whether Paraguay is comparable to other countries. I perform two analyses already
present in the literature—never conducted together in cases of female-biased sex ratios—of the
effects of female-biased sex ratios.38 Firstly, I establish the short-term effects of the war—
proxied by WID—on female labour participation (Goldin, 1991; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Goldin
and Olivetti, 2013). I use teachers’ data since it was the only profession available to both females
and males simultaneously. To do so, I regress
LPk = β1WIDk + εjk (D.1)
where LP1 = {FTPC, (MTPC − FTPC)} and FTPC and MTPC are the number of
female and male teachers per child attending school, respectively. I also control for children out
of school to proxy for how developed the school system is in each municipality in 1886.
In Table D.1, I present the OLS estimates of Equation (D.1). All coefficients are significant
and unaltered by the inclusion of the children out of school control. This implies that the
greater the impact of the war, the higher the number of female teachers per child attending
school. Furthermore, the results presented in columns (3) and (4) suggest that females replaced
males as teachers in areas where the impact of the war was more pronounced. These results are
in line with the literature and, in particular, with the predictions by Becker (1973).
Table D.1: WID and Female Teachers Per Child at School in 1886
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FTPC FTPC MTPC-FTPC MTPC-FTPC
WID 0.121*** 0.111*** -0.269*** -0.238***
(0.0335) (0.0352) (0.0827) (0.0842)
Observations 87 87 87 87
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.124 0.057 0.195
Controlling for OSR All No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes:
(1) FTPC and MTPC stand for female and male teacher per child at school, respectively.
(2) OSR All stands for out-of-school rates for all children.
I then perform a second analysis which quantifies the long-term impact of the war on female
labour participation and the type of participation similar to Teso (2018). To quantify the long-
term effects of the war on female labour participation, I use the contemporaneous data provided
by CEPEP. In this case, the sample is not restricted to females reporting as having had an
intimate partner. Thus, this sample is composed of 13,516 females of which 5,813 report as
participating in work activities. In CEPEP’s surveys, females are asked if they work, and in
the event of an affirmative response, they are asked if they do so outside the home. This is an
important distinction in the context of high levels of labour informality. I then regress
P (LP2 = 1 |WIDk, Xijk) = 1 (β1WIDk +X ′ijk∆ ≥ εijk) (D.2)
where LP2 = {FLP, FLPOHH}, FLP is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the female
interviewed answers affirmatively to the question of whether they are working, and FLPOHH
is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the female interviewed answers affirmatively to the
question of whether they are working outside the home, conditional on them working. I control
38A similar analysis is performed in a context of male-biased sex ratios by Grosjean and Khattar (2019).
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Table D.2: WID and Female Labour Participation (logit and marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FLP FLPOHH FLP FLPOHH
WID 3.779*** 6.327*** 5.650*** 8.440***
(0.541) (1.938) (1.087) (2.330)
Marginal effects 0.921*** 1.159*** 1.386*** 1.637***
(0.132) (0.350) (0.267) (0.447)
N 13516 5813 9186 4012
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Including singles Yes Yes No No
pseudo R2 .1072 .0943 .1203 .1038
Number of clusters 507 494 503 487
Dep. var. mean 0.430 0.730 0.437 0.706
Dep. var. st. dev. 0.495 0.444 0.496 0.456
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes:
(1) FLP and FLPOHH stand for female labour participation and female labour
participation outside the household respectively.
(2) Individual-level controls include age, area (urban/rural), highest education
level, whether the respondent speaks Spanish and whether she has a partner.
for individual covariates and cluster the errors at the neighbourhood level, similar to previous
specifications.39
In Table D.2, I present the logit results for Equation (D.2) and their respective marginal
effects. Female labour participation coefficients are significant in all cases, independent of the
type, the inclusion of individual-level controls or whether I included single females in the sample.
These results imply, in line with the literature, that, more than 100 years later, in areas more
heavily affected by the war, female labour participation is higher. Finally, I analyse which type
of working conditions females are most likely to face. To do so, I explore the following outcomes:
employed (which takes value 1 if females are employed with a monthly wage), daily paid (which
takes value 1 if females are employed and paid by the day), self-employed, and employer (which
takes value 1 if the female is an employer). All these outcomes are evaluated in the sub-sample
of females working outside the household.
In Table D.3, I present the logit coefficients associated with the outcomes described and
their respective marginal effects. The coefficients associated with daily paid, self-employment
and employer status are significant in the full sample, while only the first two hold after excluding
single females from the sample. In the case of daily paid, the coefficient is negative. This implies
that the greater the effect of the war in a neighbourhood, the lower the likelihood of females
being hired and paid daily. Since people employed in this fashion usually suffer from high job
insecurity (both from a legal perspective and as a consequence of the business cycle), this result
implies that females in areas more heavily affected by the war are less likely to work in daily
paid jobs, conditional on working outside the household and, therefore, less likely to suffer from
job insecurity. In the case of self-employed females, the coefficient is positive and significant. In
the literature, self-employment, as well as employing others, are usually outcomes dominated by
males. This evidence suggests that females in areas that were more severely affected by the war
are more likely to participate and potentially replace males in risky endeavours.
All of these findings are in line with the results presented in the literature on the consequences
of demographic shocks, both in the short and in the long run. This implies that the Paraguayan
case is relevant and all the results presented in the main sections of this paper are important
for the development of policy recommendations. Nowadays, such events are rarely observed.
39Individual-level controls also include highest education level and a dummy accounting for the female currently
having a partner (trying to capture a higher likelihood of two income sources within the household).
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Table D.3: WID and Type of Female Labour Participation (logit and marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Employed Daily paid Self emp. Employer Employed Daily paid Self emp. Employer
WID -1.362 -4.611* 2.995*** 3.840* -1.464 -7.480** 3.065** -0.809
(1.082) (2.477) (1.088) (2.129) (1.507) (3.278) (1.542) (4.074)
Marginal effects -0.265 -0.244* 0.391*** 0.0246* -0.311 -0.397** 0.498** -0.00892
(0.210) (0.130) (0.141) (0.0144) (0.321) (0.174) (0.251) (0.0450)
N 4241 4241 4241 4190 2831 2831 2831 2791
Ind. level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Including singles Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
pseudo R2 .0592 .0686 .0672 .0958 .0607 .0718 .0498 .0602
Number of clusters 468 468 468 461 442 442 442 435
Dep. var. mean 0.719 0.0726 0.175 0.0119 0.677 0.0749 0.220 0.0161
Dep. var. st. dev. 0.449 0.260 0.380 0.109 0.468 0.263 0.414 0.126
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Individual-level controls include age, area (urban/rural), highest education level, whether the respondent speaks Spanish and whether
she has a partner.
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E Short-term Effects on Demographics and Gender Norms
E.1 WID on Female-Biased Sex Ratios
Figure E.1: Sex Ratios of the Fertile Population Immediately After the War (1870)
In Table E.1, I provide OLS estimates of the effect of WID on the male/female sex ratio in
1870 and the male/female sex ratio for the generation of those exposed to compulsory drafting in
1886. Coefficients presented in column (1) are positive. The sign of the estimate is in line with a
positive correlation between the WID measure and the male/female ratio in 1870, which implies
a positive correlation between distance to the military camps and gender imbalance. Contrary
to collective wisdom, this implies that regions more heavily affected by the war exhibit a less
pronounced gender imbalance. However, by analysing a graphical representation, the presence
of outliers becomes apparent (see Figure E.2). Given the presence of outliers, I perform an OLS
regression excluding them.
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Figure E.2: Post-War Demographics (FBSR) and WID
Comments:
(i) Exposure to the compulsory draft leads to lower post-war male/female sex ratios.
Notes:
(1) Hollow dots are considered outliers. The dashed line represents the linear prediction of
the underlying observations including outliers while the solid line does not include outliers.
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Table E.1: WID on Female-Biased Sex Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male/female Male/female Male/female Male/female Male/female Male/female
Ratio (fertile) Ratio (fertile) Ratio (fertile) Ratio (fertile) Ratio (IV) Ratio (IV)
WID 0.278 -2.159 -2.972 -2.972 0.938 -1.716
(3.200) (3.225) (2.842) (2.842) (0.897) (1.116)
N 35 33 19 19 75 75
adj. R2 -0.030 -0.018 0.013 0.013 0.001 –
Pseudo R2 – – – – – 0.0115
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Quantile
Year 1870 1870 1868/70 1868/70 1886 1886
Infections No No Yes Yes No No
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
An explanation for a positive sign is the prevalence of infectious diseases (Thompson, 1869).
Infectious diseases affected not only the drafted males in the military camps but also the civilian
population of those areas. Importantly, these diseases did not discriminate by gender.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table E.1, I present OLS estimates of the effect of WID on the
male/female sex ratio in 1870, controlling for the rate of infected individuals over the male
population in 1868. I calculate the rate of infected individuals over the male population using
the following information. First, I project the male population in December 1867/January 1868.
To do so, I use the 1846 Census data and a growth rate calculated based on the previous two
available censuses.40 Using these data, I make two projections based on assumptions regarding
pre-war gender imbalances. Secondly, I count the number of medically discharged males that
suffered from an infection—and were medically discharged because of it—according to the lists of
draft-eligible males. Finally, I calculate the ratio between the infection counts and the projected
male population. I obtain 42 observations but can only match 19 of them to the 1870 Census
to be able to control for infections. However, once I control for infections—independently of
the assumption on pre-war gender imbalance—the sign of the estimate of the effect of WID on
male/female sex ratio is negative where an increase in one standard deviation on WID (0.008)
implies a reduction in the male/female ratio of 0.024, which translates to 2.4 males per 100
females. These results suggest that when I control for the prevalence of disease, a higher WID
implies a lower male/female sex ratio.
I then look at the effect of WID on the male/female sex ratio using the 1886 Census. This
allows me to analyse a larger sample. I find that the quantile coefficient presented in column
(5) corresponds to the expected effect of the war on sex ratios.
E.2 WID on Male Survival Rates
In Table E.2, I present OLS estimates of WID on male survival rates both assuming no
gender imbalance in 1846 and assuming a level of gender imbalance in line with that in the
literature on other historic demographic shocks. All estimates are negative but non-significant.
The results are presented in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) are in line with a negative correlation
between WID and male survival rates, which implies a positive correlation between distance
to military camps and male survival rates independently of the existence of a pre-war gender
imbalance. However, given the size of the sample, I examine whether these results are driven by
the presence of outliers.
There is a single outlier, which is the municipality of Ipane´, where the MSR are 0.288 and
0.324, respectively. I therefore perform the same analysis removing Ipane from the sample and
I present the OLS estimates in Table E.2 columns (3) and (6). In both cases, the estimates are
negative but insignificant. This confirms that the outlier was not driving the results.
40In the cases where this calculation is not possible, I use the average growth rate of 1.75 percent from Whigham
and Potthast (1999).
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Table E.2: WID on Male Survival Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MSR No GI MSR No GI MSR No GI MSR Lit GI MSR Lit GI MSR Lit GI
WID -0.701 -0.697 -1.549 -0.789 -0.785 -1.743
(1.866) (1.770) (1.339) (2.099) (1.991) (1.506)
N 42 42 40 42 42 40
adj. R2 -0.021 – 0.009 -0.021 – 0.009
Pseudo R2 – 0.0134 – – 0.0134 –
Specification OLS Quantile OLS OLS Quantile OLS
Outliers Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
E.3 WID on Out-of-School Rates
In Table E.3, I present OLS estimates of the effect of WID on out-of-school rates for girls in
1886. The coefficient is negative and significant. An increase of one standard deviation in the
WID measure reduces the likelihood of girls being out of school by 5.54 percent. In column (2),
I present the OLS estimate of the effect of WID on the out-of-school rates for all children. The
coefficient is also negative but non-significant. In line with Becker’s results, in terms of absolute
human capital investments, these results suggest that the greater the effect of the war, the lower
the out-of-school rate for girls. Notably, this does not hold for all children.
In column (3), I examine the effects of the war on relative human capital investments on
girls relative to boys. The coefficient is big, positive but non-significant.
Table E.3: WID on Out of School Rates
(1) (2) (3)
OSRGirls OSRBoys OSRRatio
WID -3.962*** 0.387 4.599*
(1.393) (1.035) (2.319)
Observations 88 88 87
Adjusted R2 0.027 -0.011 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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F Male Survival Rates on IPV
Pre-War Female-Biased Sex Ratio Assumption
Table F.1: Male Survival Rates on IPV (logit and marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
(A)
Marginal effects -0.253** -0.243*** -0.0355 -0.322** -0.0889 -0.154*** -0.0149 -0.155**
(MSR Lit GI) (0.120) (0.0722) (0.0263) (0.126) (0.0706) (0.0471) (0.0352) (0.0692)
N 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358
Ind. level controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.010 0.004 0.013
Number of clusters 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
(B)
Marginal effects -0.186 0.346 -0.188 0.0741 -0.114 0.490 -0.175 0.198
(WID) (1.270) (1.218) (0.425) (1.343) (1.271) (1.193) (0.424) (1.337)
Marginal effects - - - - -0.0880 -0.160* -0.0132 -0.157
(MSR Lit GI) (0.0957) (0.0852) (0.0458) (0.0983)
N 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358
Ind. level controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 .0123 .0087 .0039 .0125 .0125 .01 .0039 .0131
Number of clusters 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280
ρ 0.0163
St. dev. WID 0.0084
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Individual-level controls include age, area (urban/rural) and whether the female speaks Spanish.
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G The Role of Fertility
I use census data from 1886 to examine whether there were changes in fertility across munic-
ipalities after the war and whether those changes play a role as part of a transmission channel.
G.1 WID on Fertility
The war could, in principle, have led to opposite outcomes with respect to fertility. On the
one hand, changes in fertility rates might be evidence of the effects of male scarcity after the war
in generating conservative gender norms.41 Among the conservative gender norms that might
arise, male reproductive control over females, particularly pregnancy promotion, might increase
overall fertility (Moore et al., 2010; Castillo and Melian, 2015).42 However, the marriage market
being worse for females also increases the numbers of unmarried females. More unmarried
females might induce less overall fertility (Brainerd, 2017). Moreover, it is also possible that in
areas more severely affected by the war, women increased their labour market participation and
lowered their fertility as observed in many contemporaneous cases.
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Figure G.1: WID and Post-War Fertility
Results:
(i) Exposure to the compulsory draft leads to lower post-war levels of fertility.
Notes:
(1) Hollow dots are considered outliers. The dashed line represents the linear prediction of the underlying
observations including outliers while the solid line does not include outliers.
In Figure G.1a and Figure G.1b, I show a negative relationship between WID and fertility,
independent of the fertility measure used and whether outliers area accounted for. Lower levels of
fertility imply a slower return of the demographic variables to their natural rates. This evidence
is in line with the idea that in marriage markets that are worse for females there are more
unmarried females with lower fertility rates and that the increase in female labour participation
after the war might have induced lower fertility rates rather than resulting in males exerting
reproductive control over females to increase fertility.
In Column (1) of Table G.1, I analyse the effect of WID on births in 1886. Since there is a
significant number of municipalities missing, in Column (2), I perform the same analysis with
the one-year-olds in the Census. The coefficient is negative but insignificant.
Since this analysis is only cross-sectional, one possible concern is that 1886 is an abnormal
year. To address this concern, I create a new measure using the five-year average. This is possible
because the report of the 1886 Census in the 1886 Statistical Year Book provides information
41A lower number of males—both in absolute and relative terms with respect to females—could have decreased
the bargaining power of females in the marriage market resulting in more conservative gender norms.
42Pregnancy promotion involves a male partner attempting to impregnate a woman, including verbal threats to
get her pregnant and forced sex. Once the female is pregnant, a male partner resorts to behaviours that threaten
a woman if she does not follow his wishes regarding the pregnancy.
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Table G.1: WID on Births per 100 Females in 1886
(1) (2) (3)
Newborns One-year-olds Five-year Average
WID 30.19 -72.11*** -71.62***
(22.79) (23.35) (19.49)
N 62 87 87
adj. R2 -0.004 0.028 0.074
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
by the age and municipality of all children up to 5 years of age born in Paraguay. One caveat
for this new measure is that it does not take into account potential spatial variation in child
mortality. However, there is no record of any particular epidemic diseases at the time that might
have affected one municipality more than the rest. In Column (3), I provide evidence that the
higher the impact of the war on a municipality, the lower the fertility levels between 1881 and
1886.
G.2 Fertility as a Transmission Channel
In conditions of male scarcity, women are less likely to marry, more likely to have children
out of wedlock, more likely to work and more likely to invest in human capital. In this section,
I analyse the role of changes in fertility after the war in the transmission channels described.
In Figure G.1a and Figure G.1b, I presented a negative relationship between WID and fertility,
independent of the fertility measure used. The role of these changes in fertility patterns can be
mechanical as lower fertility levels might have extended the duration of male scarcity in areas
more severely affected by the war. However, as shown in Section 7.1, their consequences are not
extended. Lower levels of fertility imply a slower return of the demographic variables presented
in the previous section—sex ratios and absolute number of males—to their natural rates. It
implies smaller populations and longer periods of fewer males being available relative to regions
with higher fertility levels (all relative to differences in the pre-war population). In this context,
these changes in fertility after the war might have prolonged the effects of the demographic
variables analysed in the previous section. If these changes in fertility prolonged the effects of
the female-biased sex ratios more than the effects of male survival rates, then lower levels of
IPV would be expected. Otherwise, higher levels of IPV would be expected.
In this section, I analyse whether there are long-lasting effects of the changes in fertility after
the war on current levels of IPV and which sign those effects have. To do so, I use the 1886
Census data from the 1886 Statistical Yearbook. Since data is only available by age bracket,
traditional measures of fertility cannot be constructed. However, as a proxy for fertility, I use
the number of newborn babies in the year 1886 over the number of fertile females (ages 15–50)
to estimate whether there are long-term effects of fertility in 1886 on current levels of IPV.43
P (IPVijk = 1|Birthsk, Xijk) = 1(β1 Birthsk +X ′ijkγ ≥ εijk) (G.1)
where Birthsk =
Newborns
Fertile Females · 100 are newborns per 100 females in municipality k.
I then analyse whether these prolonged effects due to low fertility can explain the long-lasting
effects of the war on IPV.
P (IPVijk = 1 |WIDjk, Birthsk, Xijk) = 1 (β1WIDjk + β2 Birthsk +X ′ijkγ ≥ εijk) (G.2)
In Table G.2 Panel (A), I show the effects of fertility on IPV. Only the coefficient of the
effect of fertility on sexual IPV is positive and significant. However, that coefficient and all the
43I assume that 2.5–3 generations live simultaneously. This assumption arises from the fact that the life expectancy
at the time was around 45 years of age.
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Table G.2: WID and Fertility on IPV (logit and marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind Emotional Physical Sexual Any kind
(A)
Marginal effects (Births - - - - 0.000270 0.000406 0.00156* 0.000275
per 100 females, 5y av.) - - - - (0.00189) (0.00129) (0.000927) (0.00208)
N - - - - 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 - - - - 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.012
Number of clusters - - - - 38 38 38 38
(B)
Marginal effects 0.912*** 0.412 0.0768 0.954*** 0.938*** 0.434* 0.126 0.981***
(WID) (0.291) (0.268) (0.103) (0.330) (0.275) (0.259) (0.105) (0.308)
Marginal effects (Births - - - - 0.000935 0.000746 0.00165* 0.000952
per 100 females, 5y av.) (0.00172) (0.00116) (0.000953) (0.00190)
N 7805 7805 7804 7805 7805 7805 7804 7805
Ind. level controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.006 0.013
Number of clusters 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Individual-level controls include the number of people in the household, age, area (urban/rural) and
whether the female speaks Spanish.
rest are very close to zero. These results suggest that there are no direct long-term effects of
the fertility changes after the war on IPV.
In Panel (B), I examine whether the effect of WID on IPV is absorbed by the fertility
control. The WID estimates do not decrease with the inclusion of the fertility regressor. These
results suggest that changes in fertility after the war have not prolonged the effects of any of the
demographic variables and, therefore, are not part of any of the transmission channels described.
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